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Abstract
To systematically study the implications of additional information about routes provided
to certain users (e.g., via GPS-based route guidance systems), we introduce a new class of
congestion games in which users have differing information sets about the available edges and
can only use routes consisting of edges in their information set. After defining the notion of
Information Constrained Wardrop Equilibrium (ICWE) for this class of congestion games and
studying its basic properties, we turn to our main focus: whether additional information can be
harmful (in the sense of generating greater equilibrium costs/delays). We formulate this question
in the form of Informational Braess’ Paradox (IBP), which extends the classic Braess’ Paradox in
traffic equilibria, and asks whether users receiving additional information can become worse off.
We provide a comprehensive answer to this question showing that in any network in the series of
linearly independent (SLI) class, which is a strict subset of series-parallel networks, IBP cannot
occur, and in any network that is not in the SLI class, there exists a configuration of edge-specific
cost functions for which IBP will occur. In the process, we establish several properties of the
SLI class of networks, which include the characterization of the complement of the SLI class in
terms of embedding a specific set of networks, and also an algorithm which determines whether
a graph is SLI in linear time. We further prove that the worst-case inefficiency performance of
ICWE is no worse than the standard Wardrop equilibrium.
1 Introduction
The advent of GPS-based route guidance systems, such as Waze or Google maps, promises a better
traffic experience to its users, as it can inform them about routes that they were not aware of or
help them choose dynamically between routes depending on recent levels of congestion. Though
other drivers might plausibly suffer increased congestion as the routes they were using become more
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congested due to this reallocation of traffic, or certain residents may experience elevated noise levels
in their side streets, it is generally presumed that the users of these systems (and perhaps society
as a whole) will benefit. In this paper, we present a framework for systematically analyzing how
changes in the information sets of users in a traffic network (e.g., due to route guidance systems)
impact the traffic equilibrium, and show the conditions under which even those with access to
additional information may suffer greater congestion.
Our formal model is a version of the well-known congestion games, augmented with multiple
types of users (drivers), each with a different information set about the available edges in the
network. These different information sets represent the differing knowledge of drivers about the
road network, which may result from their past experiences, from inputs from their social network,
or from the different route guidance systems they might rely on. A user can only utilize a route
(path between origin and destination) consisting of edges belonging to her information set. Each
edge is endowed with a latency/cost function representing costs due to congestion. We generalize
the classic notion of Wardrop equilibrium (Wardrop [1952], Beckmann et al. [1956] and Schmeidler
[1973]), where each (non-atomic) user takes the level of congestion on all edges as given and chooses
a route with minimum cost (defined as the summation of costs of edges on the route). Our no-
tion of Information Constrained Wardrop Equilibrium (ICWE), also imposes the same equilibrium
condition as Wardrop equilibrium, but only for routes that are contained in the information set of
each type of user.
After establishing the existence and essential uniqueness of ICWE and characterizing its main
properties for networks with a single origin-destination pair (an assumption we impose for simplicity
and later relax), we turn to our key question of whether expanding the information sets of some
group of users can make them worse off — in the sense of increasing the level of congestion they
suffer in equilibrium. For this purpose, we define the notion of Informational Braess’ Paradox
(IBP), designating the possibility that users with expanded information sets experience greater
equilibrium cost. We then provide a tight characterization of when IBP is and is not possible in a
traffic network.
Our main result is that IBP does not occur if and only if the network is series of linearly
independent (SLI). More specifically, this result means that in an SLI network, IBP can never
occur, ensuring that users with expanded information set always benefit from their additional
information. Conversely, if the network is not SLI, then there exists a configuration of latency/cost
functions for edges for which IBP will occur. To understand this result, let us consider what the
relevant class of networks comprises. The set of SLI networks is a subset of series-parallel networks,
which are those for which two routes never pass through any edge in opposite directions. An SLI
network is obtained by joining together a collection of linearly independent (LI) networks in series.
LI networks are those in which each route includes at least one edge that is not part of any other
route. The intuition of our main result is as follows. To show IBP does not occur in an SLI network,
we show the result on each of its LI parts. A key property of LI networks used in proving our main
result is that for a traffic network with multiple information types if we reduce the total traffic
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demand, then there exists a route with strictly less flow. When some users have more information,
they change their routing, redirecting it to some subnetwork A of the original network from some
other subnetwork B (and since the original network is LI, both A and B are also LI). All else equal,
this will increase flows in A and decrease flows in B. By the key property of LI networks, this will
reduce flows in some route in B and since users with more information have access to routes in B,
this rerouting cannot increase their costs. Other users adjust their routing by allocating flows away
from A (since flow in A has increased), which again by the LI property of the subnetwork implies
that costs of some routes in A decrease, establishing “if” part of our main result. The “only if” part
is proved by showing that every non-SLI network embeds one of the collection of networks, and we
demonstrate constructively that each one of these networks generates IBP (for some configuration
of costs).
We should also note that, since SLI is a restrictive class of networks, and few real-world networks
would fall into this class, we take this characterization to imply that IBP is difficult to rule out
in practice, and thus the new, highly-anticipated route guidance technologies may make traffic
problems worse.
Since the class of SLI networks plays a central role in our analysis, a natural question is whether
identifying SLI networks is straightforward. We answer this question by showing that whether a
given network is SLI or not can be determined in linear time. This result is based on the algorithms
for identifying series-parallel networks proposed by Valdes et al. [1979], Schoenmakers [1995], and
Eppstein [1992].
If, rather than considering a general change of information sets, we specialize the problem so
that only one user type does not have complete information about the available set of routes and
the change in question is to bring all users complete information, then we show that an IBP is
possible if and only if the network is not series-parallel. It is intuitive that this class of networks is
less restrictive than SLI, since we are now considering a specific change in information sets (thus
making IBP less likely to occur).
Our main focus is on traffic networks with a single origin-destination pair for which we provide
a full characterization of network topologies for occurrence of IBP. In Section 6.4, we consider
multiple origin-destination pairs and use our characterization to provide a sufficient condition on
the network topology under which IBP does not occur.
Our notion of IBP closely relates to the classic Braess’ Paradox (BP), introduced in Braess [1968]
and further studied in Murchland [1970] and Arnott and Small [1994], which considers whether an
additional edge in the network can increase equilibrium cost. When BP occurs in a network,
IBP with a single information type also occurs (since IBP with a single information type can be
shown to be identical to BP). Various aspects of BP and congestion games in general is stud-
ied in Murchland [1970], Steinberg and Zangwill [1983], Dafermos and Nagurney [1984], Patriksson
[1994], Bottom et al. [1999], Jahn et al. [2005], Ordo´n˜ez and Stier-Moses [2010], Meir and Parkes
[2014], Nikolova and Stier-Moses [2014], Chen et al. [2015], and Feldman and Friedler [2015]. Our
characterization of ICWE and IBP clarifies that our notion is different and, at least mathematically,
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more general. This can be seen readily from a comparison of our results to the most closely related
papers to ours in the literature, Milchtaich [2005, 2006]. The characterizations in Milchtaich [2006]
imply that BP can be ruled out in series-parallel networks. Since IBP is a generalization of BP, it
should occur in a wider class of networks, and this is indeed what our result shows- indeed SLI is a
strict subset of series-parallel networks. This result also indicates that IBP is a considerably more
pervasive phenomenon than BP. Notably, the mathematical argument for our key theorem is differ-
ent from Milchtaich [2006] due to the key difficulty relative to BP that not all users have access to
the same set of edges, and thus changes in traffic that benefit some groups of users might naturally
harm others by increasing the congestion on the routes that they were previously utilizing.
Issues related to Braess’ Paradox arise not only in the context of models of traffic, but in
various models of communication, pricing and choice over congested goods, and electrical circuits.
See e.g., Orda et al. [1993], Korilis et al. [1997], Kelly et al. [1998], and Low and Lapsley [1999] for
communication networks; the classic works by Pigou [1920] and Samuelson [1952] as well as more
recent works by Johari and Tsitsiklis [2003], Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [2007], Ashlagi et al. [2009]
and Perakis [2004] for related economic problems; Frank [1981], Cohen and Horowitz [1991], and
Cohen and Jeffries [1997] for mechanical systems and electrical circuits; and Rosenthal [1973] and
Vetta [2002] for general game-theoretic approaches. This observation also implies that the results
we present here are relevant beyond traffic networks, in fact to any resource allocation problem
over a network subject to congestion considerations. As pointed out in Newell [1980] and Sheffi
[1985] the Braess’ paradox and related inefficiencies are a clear and present challenge to traffic
engineers, who often try to restrict travel choices to improve congestion (e.g., via systems such as
ramp metering on freeway entrances).
Other inefficiencies created by providing more information in the context of traffic networks
have been studied in Mahmassani and Herman [1984], Ben-Akiva et al. [1991], Arnott et al. [1991],
and Liu et al. [2016]. In particular, Arnott et al. [1991] consider a model with atomic drivers in
which users decide on their departure time and route choice. They show that providing imper-
fect information regarding capacity/delay of roads might be worse than providing no information.
More broadly, inefficiencies created by providing more information in other contexts are studied
in Maheswaran and Bas¸ar [2003], Sanghavi and Hajek [2004], Yang and Hajek [2005], Harel et al.
[2014], Dughmi [2014], and Rogers et al. [2015], among others.
Because our analysis also presents “price of anarchy” type results, i.e., bounds on the overall level
of inefficiency that can occur in an ICWE, our paper is related to previous work on the price of an-
archy in congestion and related games started by seminal works of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou
[1999] and Roughgarden and Tardos [2002] and followed by Correa et al. [2004, 2005], and Friedman
[2004], as well as more generally to the analysis of equilibrium and inefficiency in the variants
of this class of games, including Milchtaich [2004a,b], Acemoglu et al. [2007], Mavronicolas et al.
[2007], Nisan et al. [2007], Arnott and Small [1994], Lin et al. [2004], Meir and Parkes [2015], and
Anshelevich et al. [2008]. Here, our result is that the presence of users with different information
sets does not change the worst-case inefficiency traffic equilibrium as characterized, for example, in
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Roughgarden and Tardos [2002].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model of traffic
equilibrium with users that are heterogeneous in terms of the information about routes/edges they
have access to, and then define the notion of Information Constrained Wardrop Equilibrium for
this setting. In Section 3 we prove the existence and essential uniqueness of Information Con-
strained Wardrop Equilibrium. Before moving to our main focus, in Section 4 we review some
graph-theoretic notions about series-parallel and linearly independent networks, and then intro-
duce the class of series of linearly independent networks and prove some basic properties of this
class of networks, which are then used in the rest of our analysis. Section 5 defines our notion
of Informational Braess’ Paradox. Section 6 contains our main result, showing that Informational
Braess’ Paradox occurs “if and only if” the network is not in the class of series of linearly inde-
pendent networks. Section 7 characterizes the worst-case inefficiency of Information Constrained
Wardrop Equilibrium, and finally, Section 8 concludes. All the omitted proofs are included in the
Appendix.
2 Model
We first describe the environment and then introduce our notion of Information Constrained
Wardrop Equilibrium.
2.1 Environment
We consider an undirected multigraph without self-loops denoted by G = (V, E , f) with vertex
set V , edge set E , and a function f : E → {{u, v}, u, v ∈ V, u 6= v} that maps each edge to its
end vertices. For the ease of notation we will refer to G as (V, E) and denote an edge e with
f(e) = {u, v} by e = (u, v). We use the terms node and vertex interchangeably. Each edge e ∈ E
joins two (distinct) vertices u and v, referred to as the end vertices of e. An edge e and a vertex v
are said to be incident to each other if v is an end vertex of e. A path p ∈ G of length n (n ≥ 0) is a
sequence of edges e1 . . . en in E where ei and ei+1 share a vertex. If an edge e appears on a path p,
we write e ∈ p. The first and last vertices of a path p are called the initial and terminal vertices of
p, respectively. If q is a path of the form en+1 . . . em, with the initial vertex the same as the terminal
vertex of p but all the other vertices and edges of q do not belong to p, then e1 . . . enen+1 . . . em is
also a path, denoted by p+ q. For a path p and two nodes v and u on it, we denote the section of
path between u and v by puv.
Throughout the paper, we focus on an undirected multigraph G = (V, E) together with an
ordered pair of distinct vertices, called terminals, an origin O and a destination D, referred to
as a network. A subnetwork of G is defined as (V ′, E ′), where V ′ ⊆ V and E ′ ⊆ E and for any
e = (u, v) ∈ E ′, we have u, v ∈ V ′. We assume that each vertex and edge belong to at least one
path between the initial vertex O and the terminal vertex D. This assumption is without loss of
generality because the vertices and edges that do not belong to any path from O to D are irrelevant
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for the purpose of sending traffic from O to D. Any path r with O as the initial vertex and D as
the terminal vertex will be called a route. The set of all routes in a network is denoted by R.
We suppose there are K ≥ 1 types of users (we use the terms users and players interchangeably)
and use the shorthand notation [K] = {1, . . . ,K} to denote the set of types. Each type i ∈ [K] has
total traffic demand si ∈ R
+, and we denote the vector of traffic demands by s1:K = (s1, . . . , sK).
For each type i, we use Ei ⊆ E to denote the set of edges that type i knows and Ri to denote the
routes formed by edges in Ei (assumed non-empty). We refer to Ei or Ri as type i’s information
set. We use E1:K = (E1, . . . , EK) to denote the information sets of all types.
We use f (i) = (f
(i)
r : r ∈ Ri) to denote the flow vector of type i, where for all r ∈ Ri, f
(i)
r ≥ 0
represents the amount of traffic (flow) that type i sends on route r. We use f (1:K) = (f (1), . . . , f (K))
to denote the flow vector of all types. Each edge of the network has a cost (latency) function
ce : R
+ → R+ which is continuous, nonnegative, and nondecreasing. We denote the set of all cost
functions by c = {ce : e ∈ E}. For instance, if all the cost functions are affine functions, then for any
e ∈ E , we would have ce(x) = aex+be, for some ae, be ∈ R
+. We refer to (G, E1:K , s1:K , c) as a traffic
network with multiple information types. A feasible flow is a flow vector f (1:K) = (f (1), . . . , f (K))
such that for all i ∈ [K], f (i) is a flow vector of type i, i.e., f (i) : Ri → R
+ and
∑
r∈Ri
f
(i)
r = si.
We denote the total flow on each route r by fr, i.e., fr =
∑K
i=1 f
(i)
r .
2.2 Information Constrained Wardrop Equilibrium
The cost of a route r with respect to a flow (f (1), . . . , f (K)) is the sum of the cost of the edges
that belong to this route, i.e., cr(f
(1:K)) =
∑
e∈r ce(fe), where fe denotes the amount of traffic that
passes through edge e, i.e., fe =
∑
r∈R : e∈r fr.
We assume flows get allocated at equilibrium according to a “constrained” version of Wardrop’s
principle: flows of each user type are routed along routes in her information set with minimal (and
hence equal) cost. We next formalize this equilibrium notion.
Definition 1 (Information Constrained Wardrop Equilibrium (ICWE)). A feasible flow
f (1:K) = (f (1), . . . , f (K)) is an Information Constrained Wardrop Equilibrium (ICWE) if for every
i ∈ [K] and every pair r, r˜ ∈ Ri with f
(i)
r > 0, we have
cr(f
(1:K)) ≤ cr˜(f
(1:K)). (1)
This implies that all the routes in Ri with positive flow from type i have the same cost, which is
smaller or equal to the cost of any other route in Ri. The equilibrium cost of type i, denoted by c
(i),
is then given by the cost of any route in Ri with positive flow from type i. Note that the Wardrop
Equilibrium (WE) is a special case of this definition for a traffic network with a single information
type, i.e., K = 1.
We next provide an example that illustrates this definition and how it differs from the classic
Wardrop Equilibrium.
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O D
e1
e7e6
e5
e4
e3
e2
Figure 1: Example of a network with edge cost functions given by ce1(x) = ce4(x) = ce6(x) = x
and ce2(x) = ce5(x) = ce7(x) = 1 + ax and ce3 = ax for some a > 0.
Example 1. Consider the network G = (V, E) given in Figure 1 with s1 = s, s2 = 1− s, and the
cost functions specified in Figure 1. There are 5 different routes from origin to destination, which
we denote by r1 = e1e3e4, r2 = e1e3e5, r3 = e2e3e4, r4 = e2e3e5, and r5 = e6e7. We let E1 = E and
E2 = {e6, e7}, which results in R1 = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5} and R2 = {r5}, respectively.
• If s ≤ 2+a3+2a , ICWE is f
(1)
r1 = s and f
(2)
r5 = 1 − s. The equilibrium cost of type 1 is c
(1) =
cr1(f
(1:2)) = s + as + s = s(a + 2). The equilibrium cost of type 2 is c(2) = cr5(f
(1:2)) =
(1− s) + (1 + a(1− s)) = (1− s)(1 + a) + 1. Hence, the equilibrium cost of type 1 and type
2 users need not be the same.
• If s > 2+a3+2a , ICWE is f
(1)
r1 =
2+a
3+2a , f
(1)
r5 = s −
2+a
3+2a > 0 and f
(2)
r5 = 1 − s, which give
c(1) = c(2) = (2+a)
2
3+2a . This illustrates that when different types use a common route in an
equilibrium, their equilibrium costs are the same.
3 Existence of Information Constrained Wardrop Equilibrium
In this section, we show that given a traffic network with multiple information types (G, E1:K , s1:K , c),
an ICWE always exists and it is “essentially” unique, i.e., for each type, equilibrium cost is the
same for all equilibria. Our proof for existence and essential uniqueness of ICWE relies on the
following characterization, which is a straightforward extension of the well-known optimization
characterization of Wardrop Equilibrium (see Beckmann et al. [1956] and Smith [1979]).
Proposition 1. A flow f (1:K) is an ICWE if and only if it is a solution of the following optimization
problem:
min
∑
e∈E
∫ fe
0
ce(z)dz
fe =
K∑
i=1
∑
r∈Ri : e∈r
f (i)r ,
∑
r∈Ri
f (i)r = si, and f
(i)
r ≥ 0 for all r ∈ Ri. (2)
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We call
∑
e∈E
∫ fe
0 ce(z)dz the potential function and denote it by Φ.
Using the characterization of ICWE as the minimizer of a potential function, we can now show
the existence and essential uniqueness.
Theorem 1 (Existence and Uniqueness of ICWE). Let (G, E1:K , s1:K , c) be a traffic network
with multiple information types.
• There exists an ICWE flow f (1:K) = (f (1), . . . , f (K)).
• The ICWE is essentially unique in the sense that if f (1:K) and f˜ (1:K) are both ICWE flows,
then ce(fe) = ce(f˜e) for every edge e ∈ E.
Remark 1. As shown in Milchtaich [2005], Gairing et al. [2006], and Mavronicolas et al. [2007] the
essential uniqueness of equilibrium does not hold for multiple type congestion games where different
types of users have different cost functions for the same edge. This class of congestion games is also
referred to as player-specific congestion games. Several conditions on the edge cost functions and
network topology have been proposed to guarantee the existence of an essentially unique equilibrium
(see Konishi et al. [1997], Voorneveld et al. [1999], Milchtaich [2005], Mavronicolas et al. [2007],
Georgiou et al. [2009], and Gairing and Klimm [2013]). In particular, Milchtaich [2005] provides
sufficient and necessary conditions on the network topology under which an essentially unique
equilibrium exists. Mavronicolas et al. [2007] and Georgiou et al. [2009] show that when the edge
costs are affine functions and differ by a player-specific additive constant, then an equilibrium exists.
Our model is a special case of a player-specific congestion game in which the cost of an edge e for
a type i user is ce(·) if e ∈ Ei and ∞, otherwise. Therefore, the results of Mavronicolas et al. [2007]
and Georgiou et al. [2009] can directly be used to establish the existence of an equilibrium in our
model. For completeness, we provide an alternative proof of Theorem 1 in the Appendix 9.1 based
on the classical results of Beckmann et al. [1956], Schmeidler [1973], Smith [1979], and Milchtaich
[2000].
Theorem 1 assumes that the cost functions are non-decreasing. If we strengthen this as-
sumption to strictly increasing cost functions, then the results of Roughgarden and Tardos [2002],
Mavronicolas et al. [2007], and Georgiou et al. [2009] show that the essential uniqueness result can
be strengthened. In this case, the total flow on any edge at any equilibrium would be the same.
4 Some Graph-Theoretic Notions
In this section, we first present two classes of networks namely series-parallel and linearly in-
dependent networks which we use in our characterization of IBP. In preparation for our main
graph-theoretic results, we also present equivalent characterizations of these networks and delin-
eate the relations among them. Finally, we define a new class of networks termed series of linearly
independent and present a characterization for it in terms of embedding of a few basic networks.
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Definition 2 (Series-Parallel Network (SP)). A (two-terminal) network is called series-parallel
if two routes never pass through an edge in opposite directions. Equivalently, as was shown by
Riordan and Shannon [1942], a network is series-parallel if and only if
(i) it comprises a single edge between O and D, or
(ii) it is constructed by connecting two series-parallel networks in series, i.e., by joining the
destination of one series-parallel network with the origin of the other one, or
(iii) it is constructed by connecting two series-parallel networks in parallel, i.e., by joining the
origins and destinations of two series-parallel networks.
As an example, the networks shown in Figure 2b and Figure 2c are series-parallel networks,
while the network shown in Figure 2a is not series-parallel. The reason is that two routes e1e5e4
and e2e5e3 pass through the edge e5 in opposite directions.
An important subclass of series-parallel networks are linearly independent networks.
Definition 3 (Linearly Independent Network (LI)). A (two terminal) network is called
linearly independent if each route has at least one edge that does not belong to any other route.
Equivalently, as was shown by Holzman and Law-yone [2003], a network is linearly independent if
and only if
(i) it comprises a single edge between O and D, or
(ii) it is constructed by connecting a linearly independent network in series with a single edge
network, or
(iii) it is constructed by connecting two linearly independent networks in parallel.
This class is termed linearly independent because of an algebraic characterization of the routes
when viewed as vectors in the edge space. In particular, for any r ∈ R, let vr ∈ F
|E|
2 be vr =
(v1r , . . . , v
|E|
r ), where vir = 1 if ei ∈ r and 0, otherwise. A network G is LI if and only if the set of
vectors {vr : r ∈ R} is linearly independent (see Milchtaich [2006] and Diestel [2000]).
As Definitions 2 and 3 make it clear, the class of linearly independent networks is a subset of the
class of series-parallel networks. An alternate characterization of linearly independent and series-
parallel networks is based on the “graph embedding” notion, shown by Duffin [1965] and Milchtaich
[2006], respectively. We next define a graph embedding and then present these characterizations
which will be used later in our analysis.
Definition 4 (Embedding). A network H is embedded in the network G if we can start from
H and construct G by applying the following steps in any order:
(i) Divide an edge, i.e., replace an edge with two edges with a single common end node.
(ii) Add an edge between two nodes.
9
O D
e2
e1 e3
e4
e5
(a)
O D
(b)
O D
(c)
Figure 2: Networks that cannot be embedded in SP and LI networks: Network (a) is not embedded
in SP networks, Networks (a),(b), and (c) are not embedded in LI networks.
(iii) Extend origin or destination by one edge.
Proposition 2. (a) [Milchtaich [2006]] A network G is LI if and only if none of the networks
shown in Figure 2 are embedded in it. Furthermore, a network G is LI if and only if for every
pair of routes r and r′ and every vertex v 6= O,D common to both routes, either the section
rOv is equal to r
′
Ov, or rvD is equal to r
′
vD.
(b) [Duffin [1965] and Milchtaich [2006]] A network G is SP if and only if the network shown in
Figure 2a is not embedded in it. Furthermore, a network G is SP if and only if the vertices
can be indexed in such a way that, along each route, they have increasing indices.
This proposition shows that series-parallel networks are those in which the network shown in
Figure 2a, which is referred to as Wheatstone network (see Braess [1968]), is not embedded. LI
networks, in addition, also exclude embeddings of series-parallel networks that have routes that
“cross”as indicated in Figure 2b and Figure 2c.
We now introduce a new class of networks, which we refer to as series of linearly independent
networks (SLI).
Definition 5 (Series of Linearly Independent Network (SLI)). A (two-terminal) network
G is called series of linearly independent if and only if
(i) it comprises a single linearly independent network, or
(ii) it is constructed by connecting two SLI networks in series.
A biconnected LI network is called an LI block, where a graph is biconnected if it is connected and
after removing any node and its incident edges the graph remains connected (see Bondy and Murty
[1976, Chapter 3]). Equivalently, a network G is SLI if and only if it is constructed by connecting
several LI blocks in series (see Appendix 9.2.1 for a formal proof). We refer to each of these blocks
as an LI block of SLI network G.
We next provide a new characterization of SLI networks in terms of graph embedding using the
characterizations for SP and LI networks presented in Proposition 2.
Theorem 2 (Characterization of SLI). A network G is SLI if and only if none of the networks
shown in Figure 3 are embedded in it.
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O D
e2
e1 e3
e4
e5
(b)
O D
e6
e5
e4
e3
e2
e1
(c)
O D
(d)
O D
(e)
O D
(f)
O D
(g)
O D
(h)
O D
(i)
Figure 3: Networks that cannot be embedded in SLI networks.
The class of SLI networks is a subset of series-parallel networks and a superset of linearly
independent networks. This class plays an important role in our characterization of networks that
exhibit IBP. Valdes et al. [1979] provided an algorithm to determine whether a given network is
SP in O (|E|+ |V |) steps based on a tree decomposition of SP networks. This leads to the question
whether one can find a linear time algorithm (i.e., linear in the number of vertices and edges) to
recognize an SLI network. We next use the results of Valdes et al. [1979] to show that we can
recognize whether a given network is SLI in linear time.
Proposition 3. There exists an algorithm that can determine whether a given network G is SLI
in O (|E|+ |V |).
5 Informational Braess’ Paradox
We first present the classical Braess’ Paradox (BP) which is defined for a traffic network with single
type of users with E1 = E , denoted by (G, E1, s1, c).
Definition 6 (Braess’ Paradox (BP)). Consider a traffic network with single information type
(G, E1, s1, c). BP occurs if there exists another set of cost functions cˆ with cˆe(x) ≤ ce(x) for all e ∈ E
and x ∈ R+, such that the equilibrium cost of (G, E1, s1, cˆ) is strictly larger than the equilibrium
cost of (G, E1, s1, c).
BP refers to an unexpected increase in equilibrium cost in response to a decrease in edge
costs. We next discuss the Informational Braess’ Paradox (IBP), which arises when providing more
information to a subset of users in a traffic network increases those users’ costs.
Definition 7 (Informational Braess’ Paradox (IBP)). Consider a traffic network with mul-
tiple information types (G, E1:K , s1:K , c). IBP occurs if there exist expanded information sets E˜1:K
with E1 ⊂ E˜1 ⊆ E and E˜i = Ei, for i = 2, . . . ,K, such that the equilibrium cost of type 1 in
(G, E˜1:K , s1:K , c) is strictly larger than the equilibrium cost of type 1 in (G, E1:K , s1:K , c). We de-
note the equilibrium cost of type i ∈ [K] before and after the expansion of information sets by c(i)
and c˜(i), respectively.
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The choice of type 1 users in this definition is without loss of generality, i.e., we assume that the
information set of only one type expands and the information sets of the rest of the types remain
the same. In comparing IBP to BP, first note that BP occurs in a network if and only if a special
case of BP occurs in which we decrease the cost of one of the edges from infinity to its actual
cost, i.e., equilibrium cost increases by adding a new edge to the network. The “if ”part holds
by definition and the “only if ”part holds because the special case of BP occurs in Wheatstone
network (as presented in Example 2(a)) and Wheatstone network is embedded in any network that
features BP as shown by Milchtaich [2005]. In light of this, it follows that the occurrence of IBP
is a generalization of that of BP since addition of a new edge to the network can be viewed as
expansion of the information set of a type to include that edge in a traffic network with single
information type.
The next example shows that IBP occurs in all networks shown in Figure 3, i.e., all the basic
networks that are embedded in non-SLI networks.
Example 2. In this example we will show that for all networks shown in Figure 3, there exists
an assignment of cost functions along with information sets for which IBP occurs.
(a) IBP occurs for Wheatstone network shown in Figure 3a. This follows from the occurrence of
BP on Wheatstone network as shown in Braess [1968]. We will provide the example for the
sake of completeness in Appendix 9.3.1.
(b) Consider the network shown in Figure 3b with cost functions given by ce1(x) =
1
2x, ce2(x) =
x + 34 , ce3(x) =
4
3x, ce4(x) = 2 and ce5(x) = x. The information sets are E1 = {e2, e3, e5},
E2 = {e1, e4, e5}, and E˜1 = {e1, e2, e3, e5}. For s1 =
13
4 and s2 = 1, the equilibrium flows are
f (2)e1e4 = 1, f
(2)
e5
= 0, f (1)e2e3 =
3
4
, f (1)e5 =
10
4
,
f˜ (2)e1e4 = 0, f˜
(2)
e5
= 1, f˜ (1)e2e3 = 0, f˜
(1)
e1e3
=
6
4
, f˜ (1)e5 =
7
4
.
The resulting equilibrium costs are c(1) = c(2) = 104 and c˜
(1) = c˜(2) = 114 . Since c˜
(1) > c(1), IBP
occurs in this network. The main intuition for this example is as follows. After adding e1 to
E1, type 1 users will no longer use e2e3 and instead redirect part of their flow over e1e3. This
in turn will increase the cost of e1e4 for type 2 users, and induce them to redirect all their
flow from e1e4 to e5. In balancing the costs of e1e3 and e5 for type 1 users, their equilibrium
cost goes up.
(c) Finally, for the networks shown in Figures 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 3h, and 3i, IBP occurs if we use
the same setting as part (b) and include extra edges in all information sets with zero cost.
Remark 2. In Appendix 9.3.2, we show that Example 2(b) is not degenerate and provide an
infinite set of (affine) cost functions for which IBP occurs in this network. Similar to Example 2(c),
this argument extends to show that there are infinitely many cost functions for which IBP occurs
in networks shown in Figures 3c,. . . , 3i. Finally, for the network shown in Figure 3a, there are
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infinitely many cost functions for which BP occurs when edge e5 is added, hence IBP occurs as well
(see e.g. Steinberg and Zangwill [1983]).
In a seminal paper, Milchtaich [2006] provided necessary and sufficient conditions on the network
topology under which BP occurs. In particular, Milchtaich [2006] showed that for a given traffic
network with single information type (G, E1, s1, c), BP does not occur if and only if G is SP. That
is, if G is SP, then for any assignment of cost functions c and traffic demand, BP does not occur,
and if G is not SP, then there exists an assignment of cost functions c for which BP occurs.
We next investigate conditions on the topology of the network under which IBP occurs. Similar
to the characterization provided by Milchtaich [2006], we will identify classes of networks for which
IBP does not occur regardless of the cost functions of the edges. Since, as already noted, IBP
is a strict generalization of BP, we will see that IBP can occur in a broader class of networks,
underscoring the problem mentioned in the introduction that IBP is likely to be a more pervasive
problem.
6 Characterization of Informational Braess’ Paradox
In this section, after establishing the key lemmas which underpin the rest of our analysis, we provide
our main characterization of IBP. In Subsection 6.3 we provide a characterization for IBP for a
more restricted type of change in information sets. We conclude this section with a discussion of
extensions of our results to multiple origin-destination pairs.
6.1 Three Key Lemmas
The following lemmas identify properties of the traffic network consisting of heterogeneous users
over an LI network.
Lemma 1. (a) Given an LI network G , let f (1:K) and f˜ (1:K) be two arbitrary non-identical
feasible flows for two traffic networks (G, E1:K , s1:K , c) and (G, E1:K , s˜1:K , c), respectively. If∑K
i=1 si ≥
∑K
i=1 s˜i, then there exists a route r such that
∑K
i=1 f
(i)
r >
∑K
i=1 f˜
(i)
r and fe ≥ f˜e,
for all e ∈ r.
(b) Given an LI network G, let c(i) and c˜(i) denote the equilibrium cost of type i ∈ [K] users in
traffic networks (G, E1:K , s1:K , c) and (G, E˜1:K , s1:K , c), respectively. If E1 ⊆ E˜1 and E˜i = Ei,
for i = 2, . . . ,K, then there exists some i ∈ [K] such that c˜(i) ≤ c(i).
This lemma directly follows from Milchtaich [2006, Lemma 5 and Theorem 3]. The first part
of the this lemma shows that in an LI network, if the total traffic increases, then there exists at
least one route whose flow strictly increases, and the flow on each of its edges weakly increases.
The second part shows that in an LI network, if we expand the information set of type 1 users,
then the equilibrium cost of at least one of the types does not increase. In fact, a similar argument
shows that even if we expand the information set of multiple types, then the equilibrium cost of at
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least one of the types does not increase (see Milchtaich [2006, Theorem 3]). Note that this result is
not sufficient for establishing that IBP does not occur over LI networks because what we need to
establish is that it is the equilibrium cost of type 1 users that does not increase. For completeness,
in Appendix 9.4.1, we show how this lemma follows from the results of Milchtaich [2006].
The next lemma shows a property of equilibrium flows and equilibrium costs in a network which
is the result of attaching two networks in series. We use the following definition to state the lemma.
Suppose f (1:K) is a feasible flow for (G, E1:K , s1:K , c) where G is the result of attaching G1 and
G2 in series. We denote the attaching point of G1 and G2 by D1. The restriction of f
(1:K) to G1
(similarly to G2) is defined as f¯
(1:K) = (f¯ (1), . . . , f¯ (K)) where the flow of type i on any route r¯ in
G1 is the summation of the flows of type i on all routes of G which contain r¯. Formally, for any
i ∈ [K] we have f¯ (i)(r¯) =
∑
r∈R¯i(r¯)
f (i)(r), where R¯i(r¯) = {r ∈ Ri : rOD1 = r¯}. Note that f¯
(1:K)
is a feasible flow on G1.
Lemma 2. (a) If G is the result of attaching two networks G1 and G2 in series, then the restric-
tion of an equilibrium flow for G to each of G1 and G2 is an equilibrium flow.
(b) If G is the result of attaching two networks G1 and G2 in series, then the equilibrium cost of
any type on G is the summation of the equilibrium costs of that type on G1 and G2.
The third lemma shows our key lemma that we will use in the proof of Theorem 3. Intuitively,
this lemma states that in an LI network, if we decrease the traffic on one subset of routes RA of the
network and reroute it through the rest of the routes in the network, denoted by RB = R\RA, then
the maximum cost improvement over all the routes in RA cannot be smaller than the minimum
cost improvement over all the routes in RB . This result will enable us to establish that in an LI or
SLI network, the reallocation of traffic due to one type of users obtaining more information cannot
harm that type.
Lemma 3. Given an LI network G, we let RA,RB 6= ∅ denote a partition of routes R, i.e.,
RB = R \RA. We let f
(1:K) and f˜ (1:K) be two feasible flows for traffic networks (G, E1:K , s1:K , c)
and (G, E1:K , s˜1:K , c), respectively. For these two flows, we let the traffic over RA and RB be sA =∑
r∈RA
∑K
i=1 f
(i)
r , s˜A =
∑
r∈RA
∑K
i=1 f˜
(i)
r , sB =
∑
r∈RB
∑K
i=1 f
(i)
r , and s˜B =
∑
r∈RB
∑K
i=1 f˜
(i)
r . If
s˜A ≤ sA and s˜B ≥ sB, then we have
max
r∈RA
{cr − c˜r} ≥ min
r∈RB
{cr − c˜r},
where for any route r, cr and c˜r denote the cost of this route with flows f
(1:K) and f˜ (1:K), respec-
tively.
Before proving this lemma for a general LI network, let us show it for the special case where
G consists of parallel edges from O to D. In this case RA and RB are two disjoint sets of edges
from O to D. Since s˜A ≤ sA, there exists an edge eA in RA such that f˜eA ≤ feA. Similarly, since
s˜B ≥ sB , there exists eB ∈ RB such that f˜eB ≥ feB . Since the cost functions are nondecreasing,
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we have
max
r∈RA
{cr − c˜r} ≥ ceA(feA)− ceA(f˜eA) ≥ 0 ≥ ceB (feB)− ceB (f˜eB) ≥ min
r∈RB
{cr − c˜r},
which is the desired result. The proof for the general case is by induction on the number of edges
and is included next.
Proof. We first note a consequence of Proposition 2:
Claim 1: If a network G is LI then for any vertex v, either the sections from O to v of all routes
that pass through v (which consists of v and all the vertices and edges preceding it on the route)
are identical or the sections from v to D of all routes that pass through v (which consists of v
and all the vertices and edges succeeding it on the route) are identical. Consider a route r that
passes through v. First, note that since G is SP, part (b) of Proposition 2 implies that the only
common node of rOv and rvD is v. Also, the only common node of r
′
Ov and r
′
vD is v. Claim 1
follows since if the contrary holds, then there exist two routes r = rOv + rvD and r
′ = r′Ov + r
′
vD
with a common vertex v such that rOv 6= r
′
Ov and rvD 6= r
′
vD. This contradicts the statement of
part (a) of Proposition 2.
We now prove Lemma 3 using induction on the number of edges. For a single edge it evidently
holds. For a general LI network, we have the following cases:
• There exists r ∈ RA such that cr ≥ c˜r and r
′ ∈ RB such that cr′ ≤ c˜r′ . This leads to
max
r∈RA
{cr − c˜r} ≥ cr − c˜r ≥ 0 ≥ cr′ − c˜r′ ≥ min
r∈RB
{cr − c˜r},
which concludes the proof in this case.
• For any r ∈ RA, we have cr < c˜r. We break the proof into three steps.
Step 1: There exists a route r ∈ RA and an edge e ∈ r with the following properties: (i)
The flow on r from s˜A is less than or equal to the flow on r from sA. (ii) The flow on e from
s˜B is larger than the flow on e from sB and the flow on e from s˜A is less than or equal to the
flow on e from sA.
This step follows from invoking part (a) of Lemma 1. Since s˜A ≤ sA, using part (a) of Lemma
1 there exists a route r ∈ RA such that the flow on each edge of r from s˜A is less than or
equal to the flow from sA. However, we know that the overall cost of any r ∈ RA has gone
up, i.e., c˜r > cr. This implies that there exists an edge e ∈ r such that the flow from s˜B on e
is more than the flow from sB on e.
Step 2: Let Re denote the set of routes using edge e = (ue, ve) as defined in Step 1. Re has
the following properties: (i) Either there exists a vertex D′ ∈ V such that all routes r ∈ Re
have a common path from O to ve and a common path from D
′ to D, or there exists a vertex
O′ ∈ V such that all routes r ∈ Re have a common path from ue to D and a common path
from O to O′. Without loss of generality, we assume it is the former case. (ii) There exists
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a subnetwork G′ with origin O′ = ve and destination D
′ such that for the restricted parts
of RA and RB over G
′, denoted by R′A and R
′
B , if we let s
′
A, s˜
′
A, s
′
B, and s˜
′
B to denote the
corresponding traffic demands on R′A and R
′
B , then we have s˜
′
A ≤ s
′
A and s˜
′
B ≥ s
′
B.
Using Claim 1, for an edge e = (ue, ve) either there is a unique path from O to ve, or there
is a unique path from ve to D; we assume without loss of generality it is the former case.
We let D′ to be the first node on route r such that all routes in Re coincide from D
′ to D.
Therefore, all routes r ∈ Re have a common path from O to ve and a common path from D
′
to D, showing the first property.
We next show that the subnetwork consisting of all routes from ve to D
′, denoted by G′,
satisfies the second property. To see this, note that the flows on G′ are only the ones that are
passing through edge e. From Step 1, we know that the flow on e from s˜B is larger than the
flow on e from sB and the flow on e from s˜A is less than or equal to the flow on e from sA,
showing the second property.
Step 3: Using steps 1 and 2, and induction hypothesis for G′, we will show that
max
r∈RA
{cr − c˜r} ≥ min
r∈RB
{cr − c˜r}.
First note that Re ∩ RA 6= ∅ since r ∈ RA and e ∈ r. Furthermore, Re ∩ RB 6= ∅, since as
explained in Step 1, the flow on e from s˜B is strictly positive. This in turn shows that R
′
A
and R′B are nonempty. Using Step 2, all the conditions of Lemma 3 hold for subnetwork G
′.
Therefore, we can use the induction hypothesis for LI network G′ to obtain
max
r∈R′
A
{cr − c˜r} ≥ min
r∈R′
B
{cr − c˜r}.
Using Step 2, for all the routes in Re the costs of going from O to O
′, denoted by cO′→O are
the same. Similarly, the costs of all routes in Re going from D
′ to D, denoted by cD′→D are
the same. Therefore, we have
max
r∈RA
{cr − c˜r} ≥ max
r∈RA∩Re
{cr − c˜r} = (cO→O′ − c˜O→O′) + max
r∈R′
A
{cr − c˜r}+ (cD′→D − c˜D′→D)
≥ (cO→O′ − c˜O→O′) + min
r∈R′
B
{cr − c˜r}+ (cD′→D − c˜D′→D) = min
r∈RB∩Re
{cr − c˜r} ≥ min
r∈RB
{cr − c˜r},
which concludes the proof in this case.
• For any r ∈ RB , we have cr > c˜r. The proof of this case is similar to the previous case. We
state the three steps without repeating the reasoning for each of them.
Step 1: There exists a route r ∈ RB and an edge e ∈ r with the following properties: (i)
The flow on r from s˜B is larger than or equal to the flow on r from sB. (ii) The flow on e
from s˜A is smaller than the flow on e from sA and the flow on e from s˜B is larger than or
equal to the flow on e from sB.
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Step 2: Let Re denote the set of routes using edge e = (ue, ve) as defined in Step 1. We have
the following properties: (i) Either there exists a vertex D′ ∈ V such that all routes r ∈ Re
have a common path from O to ve and a common path from D
′ to D, or there exists a vertex
O′ ∈ V such that all routes r ∈ Re have a common path from ue to D and a common path
from O to O′. Without loss of generality, we assume it is the former case. (ii) There exists
a subnetwork G′ with origin O′ = ve and destination D
′ such that for the restricted parts
of RA and RB over G
′, denoted by R′A and R
′
B , if we let s
′
A, s˜
′
A, s
′
B, and s˜
′
B to denote the
corresponding traffic on R′A and R
′
B , then we have s˜
′
A ≤ s
′
A and s˜
′
B ≥ s
′
B.
Step 3: Again, using steps 1 and 2, and induction hypothesis for G′, we have
max
r∈RA
{cr − c˜r} ≥ min
r∈RB
{cr − c˜r},
which completes the proof.
6.2 Characterization of Informational Braess’ Paradox
We next present our main result, which states that IBP does not occur if and only if the network
is SLI. The idea of this result, as already discussed in the Introduction, is the following. To show
the “if” part, we note that using Lemma 2 it suffices to show IBP does not occur in LI networks.
Consider an expansion of the information set of type 1 and the new equilibrium flows. If the
equilibrium cost of type 1 increases, then ICWE definition implies the following:
• Consider all types with increased equilibrium costs (including type 1). All routes used by
these types (in the equilibrium before information expansion) have higher costs in the new
equilibrium.
• Consider all types with decreased equilibrium costs. All routes used by these types (in the
equilibrium after information expansion) have lower costs in the new equilibrium.
Using these two claims, it follows that the total flow sent over the routes with higher costs is lower,
and the total flow sent over the routes with lower costs is higher (see Figure 4). Since the network
is LI, Lemma 3 leads to a contradiction. The “only if” part holds because any non-SLI network
embeds one of the networks shown in Figure 3, and an IBP can be constructed for each of them
(Example 2) which then extends to an IBP for the non-SLI network.
Theorem 3 (Characterization of IBP). IBP does not occur if and only if G is SLI. More
specifically, we have the following.
(a) If G is SLI, for any traffic network (G, E1:K , s1:K , c) with arbitrary assignment of cost func-
tions c, K, traffic demands s1:K , and information sets E1:K , IBP does not occur.
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(b) If G is not SLI, there exists an assignment of cost functions c, K, traffic demands s1:K , and
information sets E1:K in which IBP occurs.
Proof. Part (a): To reach a contradiction, suppose that c˜(1) > c(1). By Definition 5, G is obtained
from attaching several LI blocks in series, denoted by G1, . . . , GN for some N ≥ 1. Using part
(b) of Lemma 2, we have c˜(1) =
∑N
t=1 c˜
(1)
t >
∑N
t=1 c
(1)
t = c
(1), where c
(1)
t denotes the equilibrium
cost of type 1 users in Gt. Therefore, there exists one LI block such as j for which c˜
(1)
j > c
(1)
j .
Also, using part(a) of Lemma 2, the restriction of equilibrium flows f (1:K) and f˜ (1:K) to Gj creates
an equilibrium flow for this LI block. Therefore, IBP occurs in LI block Gj . In the rest of the
proof of part (a), we will assume IBP occurs in an LI block (and hence LI network) and reach a
contradiction. We let f (1:K) and f˜ (1:K) be the equilibrium flows before and after the information
set expansion. Also, for any route r ∈ R, we let cr and c˜r to denote the cost of route r with flows
f (1:K) and f˜ (1:K), respectively.
We partition the set [K] into groups A and B as follows
A = {i ∈ [k] : c˜(i) > c(i)},
and
B = {i ∈ [k] : c˜(i) ≤ c(i)},
i.e., set A denotes all types with higher equilibrium cost in the game with higher information, and
set B denotes the rest of the types.
We also partition the routes of the network into two subsets RA and RB , where
RA = {r ∈ R : c˜r > cr},
and
RB = {r ∈ R : c˜r ≤ cr},
i.e., RA denotes all routes that have higher costs in the game with higher information, and RB
denotes the rest of the routes. We show the following claims:
Claim 1: For any type i ∈ A and any route r ∈ RB , we have f
(i)
r = 0, i.e., for a given type i,
if the equilibrium cost increases in the game with higher information, then the cost of all routes
that type i was using (with strictly positive flow) also increases. This follows since if r 6∈ Ri, then
f
(i)
r = 0. Otherwise, r ∈ Ri which implies r ∈ R˜i as well, where R˜i denotes the set of available
routes to type i in the expanded information set. Assuming i ∈ A and r ∈ RB , we have
cr ≥ c˜r ≥ c˜
(i) > c(i),
where the first inequality follows from the definition of the set RB . The second inequality follows
from the definition of ICWE. The third inequality follows from the definition of set A. The overall
inequality and the definition of ICWE show that f
(i)
r = 0.
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Figure 4: Proof of Theorem 3: set A (B) represents types with higher (lower) equilibrium costs and
set RA (RB) represents routes with higher (lower) costs. There is no dashed (blue) arrow from A
to RB which illustrates Claim 1 and there is no solid arrow (red) from B to RA which illustrates
Claim 2.
Claim 2: For any type i ∈ B and any route r ∈ RA, we have f˜
(i)
r = 0, i.e., for a given route, if
the cost of the route in the equilibrium increases in the game with higher information, then the
equilibrium costs of all types that are using this route in the equilibrium of the higher information
game also increases. This follows since if r 6∈ R˜i, then f˜
(i)
r = 0. Otherwise, r ∈ R˜i which implies
r ∈ Ri, because 1 6∈ B and information set of all other types are fixed. Assuming i ∈ B and
r ∈ RA, we have
c˜r > cr ≥ c
(i) ≥ c˜(i),
where the first inequality follows from the definition of the set RA. The second inequality follows
from the definition of ICWE. The third inequality follows from the definition of set B. The overall
inequality and the definition of ICWE show that f˜
(i)
r = 0.
Claim 3: Letting sA =
∑
r∈RA
∑K
i=1 f
(i)
r , s˜A =
∑
r∈RA
∑K
i=1 f˜
(i)
r , sB =
∑
r∈RB
∑K
i=1 f
(i)
r , and
s˜B =
∑
r∈RB
∑K
i=1 f˜
(i)
r , we have s˜A ≤ sA and s˜B ≥ sB .
This follows from Claims 1 and 2. The traffic on the routes in RA from f
(1:K) is sA which is the
entire traffic demand si for all i ∈ A (Claim 1) and possibly some portion of the traffic demand sj
for j ∈ B. On the other hand, the traffic on the routes in RA from f˜
(1:K) is s˜A, which contains
only some portion of the traffic demand si for i ∈ A. Claim 2 implies that for all j ∈ B the traffic
demand s˜j is only sent on the routes in RB . This shows that s˜A ≤ sA which in turn leads to
s˜B ≥ sB (see Figure 4 for an illustration of the partitioning and the flows).
Part (b) of Lemma 1 shows that there exists type i for which c˜(i) ≤ c(i), which in turn shows
that set B is nonempty. Also by the contradiction assumption 1 ∈ A, which implies that both A
and B are nonempty. Using Claim 1, if A is nonempty, then RA 6= ∅ as the flow f
(1:K) of the types
in A can only go to routes in RA. Also using Claim 2, since B is nonempty, we have RB 6= ∅ as
the flow f˜ (1:K) of the types in B can only go to routes in RB . Therefore, we have partitioned the
routes of the network into two nonempty sets RA and RB such that c˜r > cr for all r ∈ RA and
c˜r ≤ cr for all r ∈ RB. In other words, we have maxr∈RA{cr − c˜r} < 0 and minr∈RB{cr − c˜r} ≥ 0.
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We now have all the pieces to use Lemma 3 which yields
0 > max
r∈RA
{cr − c˜r} ≥ min
r∈RB
{cr − c˜r} ≥ 0,
which is a contradiction, completing the proof of part (a).
Part (b): The proof of this part follows from Theorem 2. Let G be a non-SLI network. Using
Theorem 2, one of the networks shown in Figure 3 must be embedded in G. Using Example 2, for
all networks shown in Figure 3, there exists an assignment of cost functions and information sets
for which IBP occurs.
To construct an example for G we start from the cost functions for which the embedded network
features IBP (as shown in Example 2) and then following the steps of embedding, given in Definition
4, we will update the information sets as well as the cost functions in a way that IBP occurs in the
final network G. The updates of information sets and cost functions are as follows.
(i) If the step of embedding is to divide an edge, we assign half of the original edge cost to each
of the new edges and update the information set by adding both newly created edges to the
same information set as of the original edge. This guarantees that the equilibrium flow of the
network after dividing an edge is the same as the one before.
(ii) If the step of embedding is to add an edge, then we include that edge in none of the information
sets (or equivalently assign cost infinity to it). This guarantees that the new edge is never
used in any equilibrium.
(iii) If the step of embedding is to extend origin or destination, we let the cost of the new edge to
be c(x) = x and update all of the information sets by adding this edge to them. Since this
edge will be used by all types and the flow on it will not change, this step of embedding does
not affect the equilibrium flow.
This construction establishes that since IBP is present in the initial network, i.e., one of the networks
shown in Figure 3, it will be present in the network G as well. This completes the proof of part
(b).
Recall that in Remark 2 we showed for each of the networks shown in Figure 3 there exist
infinitely many cost functions for which IBP occurs. This shows that if IBP occurs in a network,
then it occurs for infinitely many cost functions. Because, if IBP occurs in a network G, Theorem 3
part (a) implies G is not SLI and Theorem 2 shows that one of the basic networks shown in Figure
3 is embedded in G. Finally, by construction of the proof of Theorem 3 part (b), the cost function
configuration of the basic network can be extended to network G, showing that IBP occurs for
infinitely many cost functions.
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6.3 IBP with Restricted Information Sets
In this subsection, we show that restricting focus to networks with a much more specific information
structure — whereby only one type does not know all the edges and the change in question informs
this type of all edges — allows us to establish that IBP does not occur in a larger set of networks.
Interestingly, in this case, IBP does not occur in exactly the same set of networks on which BP
does not occur, series-parallel networks, though the two concepts continue to be very different even
under this more specific information structure. The similarity is that after the change, as in the
classic Wardrop Equilibrium setting studied for BP, there is no more heterogeneity among users.
We first define IBP with restricted information sets and then state the characterization of network
topology which leads to it.
Definition 8 (IBP with Restricted Information Sets). Consider a traffic network with
multiple information types (G, E1:K , s1:K , c). IBP with restricted information sets occurs if there
exist expanded information sets E˜1:K with E1 ⊂ E˜1 = E , and Ei = E˜i = E for i = 2, . . . ,K, such that
the equilibrium cost of type 1 in (G, E˜1:K , s1:K , c) is strictly larger than the equilibrium cost of type
1 in (G, E1:K , s1:K , c). We denote the equilibrium cost of type i ∈ [K] before and after expansion
of information by c(i) and c˜(i), respectively.
Theorem 4. IBP with restricted information sets does not occur if and only if the network G is
SP. More specifically, we have the following.
(a) If G is SP, for any network with multiple information sets (G, E1:K , s1:K , c) with arbitrary
assignment of cost functions c, K, traffic demands s1:K , and information set E1, IBP with
the restricted information sets does not occur.
(b) If G is not SP, there exists an assignment of cost functions c, K, traffic demands s1:K , and
information set E1 in which IBP with restricted information sets occurs.
6.4 Extension to Multiple Origin-Destination Pairs
In this subsection, we consider networks with multiple information types and multiple origin-
destination pairs as defined next.
Definition 9. Consider a graph G = (V, E) containing m origin-destination pairs denoted by
(Oi,Di), i ∈ [m]. For any i ∈ [m], there areKi types of users, each with information set Ei,j ⊆ E , for
j ∈ [Ki]. We refer to (i, j) as the type of a user where i ∈ [m] denotes the origin-destination pair of
this type and j ∈ [Ki] represents its information set. The traffic network with multiple information
types and multiple origin-destination pairs is denoted by
(
G, {Ei,1:Ki}
m
i=1 , {si,1:Ki}
m
i=1 , c
)
. We let
Ri,j to denote the set of routes available to a user of type (i, j) (i.e., routes formed by edges in
Ei,j). A feasible flow is a flow vector f = (f
(1,1:K1), . . . , f (m,1:Km)) such that f (i,1:Ki) is a feasible
flow for origin-destination pair (Oi,Di).
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We denote the total flow on an edge e by fe where fe =
∑m
i=1
∑Ki
j=1
∑
r∈Ri,j : e∈r
f
(i,j)
r . Note
that since G is an undirected graph, the total flow on each edge is the sum of the flows sent through
that edge in either direction (see Lin et al. [2011] and Holzman and Monderer [2015]). The cost of
a route r is defined as cr(f) =
∑
e∈r ce(fe). ICWE in this case is defined naturally as follows:
A feasible flow f = (f (1,1:K1), . . . , f (m,1:Km)) is an Information Constrained Wardrop Equilib-
rium (ICWE) if for every i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [Ki] and every pair r, r˜ ∈ Ri,j with f
(i,j)
r > 0, we
have
cr(f) ≤ cr˜(f). (3)
This implies that all routes of type (i, j) with positive flow have the same cost, which is smaller
than or equal to the cost of any other route in Ri,j. The equilibrium cost of type (i, j), denoted by
c(i,j), is then given by the cost of any route in Ri,j with positive flow from type (i, j).
The existence of ICWE in this setting follows from an identical argument to that of Theorem
1. Finally, the definition of IBP for this extended setting is as follows.
Definition 10 (IBP with Multiple Origin-destination Pairs). Consider a traffic network with
multiple information types and multiple origin-destination pairs
(
G, {Ei,1:Ki}
m
i=1 , {si,1:Ki}
m
i=1 , c
)
.
IBP occurs if there exists an expanded information set
{
E˜i,1:Ki
}m
i=1
with E1,1 ⊂ E˜1,1 and E˜i,j =
Ei,j, for all (i, j) 6= (1, 1), i ∈ [m], j ∈ [Ki], such that the equilibrium cost of type (1, 1)
in
(
G,
{
E˜i,1:Ki
}m
i=1
, {si,1:Ki}
m
i=1 , c
)
is strictly larger than the equilibrium cost of type (1, 1) in(
G, {Ei,1:Ki}
m
i=1 , {si,1:Ki}
m
i=1 , c
)
.
Note that the choice of type (1, 1) for information expansion is arbitrary and without loss of
generality. We next establish a sufficient condition on the network topology under which IBP
with multiple origin-destination pairs does not arise. We will use the following definitions from
Chen et al. [2016].
Definition 11.
• For any origin-destination pair (Oi,Di), the relevant network i denoted by Gi = (Vi, Ei)
consists of all edges and nodes of G that belong to at least one route from Oi to Di in G.
• For an SLI network Gi, each LI block has two terminal nodes, an origin and a destination,
such that the origin is the first node and the destination is the last node in the block visited
on any route in Gi. For two SLI networks Gi and Gj , a coincident LI block is a common
LI block of Gi and Gj with the same set of terminal nodes, allowing origin of one to be the
destination of other.
Note that the definition of relevant network Gi as well as its LI blocks depend only on the
network G and the origin-destination pair (Oi,Di), not on the information sets. Based on this
definition, we next provide a sufficient condition for excluding IBP.
Proposition 4. Let G be a graph with m ≥ 1 origin-destination pairs. For any i ∈ [m], let
Gi = (Vi, Ei) be the relevant network for origin-destination pair (Oi,Di). IBP does not occur if the
following two conditions hold.
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(a) For any i ∈ [m], the network Gi is SLI.
(b) For any i, i′ ∈ [m] either Ei∩Ei′ = ∅ or Ei ∩Ei′ consists of all coincident blocks of Gi and Gi′ .
Proof. We let f and f˜ denote the equilibrium flows before and after the expansion of information
set of type (1, 1). To reach a contradiction suppose c˜(1,1) > c(1,1). Using Lemma 2 part (b) and
condition (a) of the proposition, the equilibrium cost of type (1, 1) users is the sum of equilibrium
cost of the LI blocks of G1. Since c˜
(1,1) > c(1,1), there exists an LI block of G1 for which the
equilibrium cost after expanding information set of type (1, 1) increases. We denote this LI block
by G∗ and its corresponding origin and destination by O∗ and D∗. Using condition (b) for any
i 6= 1 we have one of the following two cases: (i) Gi does not have any common edge with G
∗ and
therefore none of the route flows of (Oi,Di) go through any edge of G
∗ (ii) O∗ and D∗ belong to
all routes of Gi and therefore all route flows of (Oi,Di) go through G
∗. We let C be the set of
indices of such origin-destination pairs, i.e., C = {i ∈ [m] : O∗,D∗ ∈ r,∀r ∈ Gi}. We next define
a traffic network with single origin-destination pair (O∗,D∗) over G∗ for which IBP has occurred.
The types of users are
(⋃
i∈C{(i, j) : j ∈ [Ki]}
)⋃
{(1, j) : j ∈ [K1]} with their corresponding
traffic demands. Note that for all i ∈ C, even though our definition of coincident LI block allows
the route flows of (Oi,Di) to go from O
∗ to D∗ in either direction, without loss of generality, we can
assume that route flows go from O∗ to D∗. This is because the cost of any edge is a function of the
sum of the flows that passes through that edge in either direction and reversing the flows does not
change the equilibrium flows on edges. Using Lemma 2 part (a) the restriction of equilibrium flows
f and f˜ to G∗ are equilibrium flows for the congestion game with multiple information types and
single origin-destination pair defined on G∗. Note that G∗ is an LI network and the equilibrium
cost of type (1, 1) users after expanding their information set has gone up, which is a contradiction
using Theorem 3.
Figure 5a shows two SLI networks with their corresponding LI blocks and Figure 5b shows a
graph with two origin-destination pairs which satisfies our sufficient condition.
The next example shows that the conditions of Proposition 4 are not necessary for non-
occurrence of IBP.
Example 3. Consider the network G shown in Figure 6. The common LI block of relevant
networks G1 and G2 is G itself which is not a coincident LI block because the sets of terminals of
this block for G1 and G2 are different. Therefore, this network does not satisfy the conditions of
Proposition 4. However, in Appendix 9.4.4 we show that for any set of edge cost functions, IBP
does not occur in this network.
In concluding this subsection we should note that BP with multiple origin destination pairs has
been studied in Epstein et al. [2009], Lin et al. [2011], Fujishige et al. [2015], Holzman and Monderer
[2015], and Chen et al. [2016]. In particular, Chen et al. [2016] provide a full characterization of
network topologies for which BP occurs with multiple origin-destination pairs. BP as defined in
Chen et al. [2016] occurs if adding an edge (decreasing cost of an edge) increases the equilibrium
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Figure 5: (a) Two SLI networks with their corresponding LI blocks. (b) A graph with two OD
pairs for which IBP does not occur.
O1, O2
e2
D2
e3
e1
D1
Figure 6: Example 3: IBP does not occur on this network.
cost of the users of one of the origin-destination pairs, even if that edge is never used by the users
of that origin-destination pair. With this definition it is possible to have a network for which IBP
does not occur while BP occurs. For instance, BP occurs in the network considered in Example 3
(see Chen et al. [2016]) while we showed IBP does not occur in this network.
7 Efficiency of Information Constrained Wardrop Equilibrium
In this section, we provide bounds on the inefficiency of ICWE. We show that the worst-case
inefficiency remains the same as the standard Wardrop Equilibrium, even though our notion of
ICWE is considerably more general than Wardrop Equilibrium since it allows for a rich amount of
heterogeneity among users.
We start by defining the social optimum defined as the feasible flow vector that minimizes the
total cost over all edges. We focus on aggregate efficiency loss defined as the ratio of total cost
experienced by all users at social optimum and ICWE. We provide tight bounds on this measure of
efficiency loss which are realized for different classes of cost functions. We also consider type-specific
efficiency loss defined as the ratio of total cost experienced by type i users at social optimum and
ICWE. We show that the bounds in this case are different from the ones in the standard Wardrop
Equilibrium.
Given a traffic network with multiple information types (G, E1:K , s1:K , c), we define the social
optimum, denoted by f
(1:K)
so = (f
(1)
so , . . . , f
(K)
so ) (or simply fso), as the optimal solution of the
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following optimization problem:
min
∑
e∈E
fe ce(fe),
fe =
K∑
i=1
∑
r∈Ri : e∈r
f (i)r ,
∑
r∈Ri
f (i)r = si, and f
(i)
r ≥ 0 for all r ∈ Ri and i. (4)
This optimization problem minimizes the total cost over all edges incurred by all users of all types.
Under the assumption that each cost function is continuous, it follows that the optimal solution of
problem Eq. (4) and hence a social optimum always exists. We denote the total cost of a feasible
flow f (1:K) by
C(f (1:K)) ,
∑
e∈E
fece(fe).
Similarly, for a feasible flow f (1:K), we define the total cost incurred by type i users as
C(i)(f (1:K)) ,
∑
e∈E
f (i)e ce(fe).
Consequently, we define the socially optimal cost of type i as C
(i)
so = C(i)(f
(1:K)
so ) for i ∈ [K] and the
overall cost (over all types) of social optimum as Cso = C(f
(1:K)
so ). Similarly, we define equilibrium
cost of type i as C
(i)
cwe = C(i)(f
(1:K)
cwe ) for i ∈ [K] and the overall cost (over all types) of ICWE
as Ccwe = C(f
(1:K)
cwe ), where f
(1:K)
cwe (or simply fcwe) denotes an ICWE. Note that C
(i)(f
(1:K)
cwe ) is
different from equilibrium cost of type i denoted by c(i), as the latter notion is the cost per unit of
flow and the former is the aggregate cost. The relation between these two is simply C
(i)
cwe = si c
(i),
i ∈ [K].
The following result from Roughgarden and Tardos [2002] and Correa et al. [2005] presents
bounds on the efficiency loss of Wardrop Equilibrium, which provides bounds on the efficiency loss
of ICWE in a traffic network with single information type with E1 = E denoted by (G, E1, s1, c).
Proposition 5 (Roughgarden and Tardos [2002]). Consider a traffic network with a single infor-
mation type (G, E1, s1, c). Let fwe be a Wardrop Equilibrium and fso be a social optimum. Then,
we have
(a) inf(G,E1,s1,c): ce convex
Cso
Cwe
= 0.
(b) Suppose ce(x) is an affine function for all e ∈ E. Then, we have
Cso
Cwe
≥ 34 , and this bound is
tight.
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(c) Let C be a class of latency functions and let β(C) = supc∈C, x≥0 β(c, x), where
β(c, x) = max
z≥0
z (c(x) − c(z))
x c(x)
.
Then, we have Cso
Cwe
≥ 1− β(C), and the bound is tight.
Our next result shows that Proposition 5 holds exactly for ICWE, indicating that within the
class of heterogeneous, information-constrained traffic equilibria we consider, the worst-case sce-
nario occurs for networks with homogeneous users.
Proposition 6. Consider a traffic network with multiple information types (G, E1:K , s1:K , c). Let
fcwe be an ICWE and fso be a social optimum. Then, we have
(a) inf(G,E1:K ,s1:K ,c): ce convex
Cso
Ccwe
= 0.
(b) Suppose ce(x) is an affine function for all e ∈ E. Then, we have
Cso
Ccwe
≥ 34 , and this bound is
tight.
(c) Let C be a class of latency functions and let β(C) = supc∈C,x≥0 β(c, x), where
β(c, x) = max
z≥0
z (c(x) − c(z))
x c(x)
.
Then, we have Cso
Ccwe
≥ 1− β(C), and the bound is tight.
Proof. We first show that for any type i, and any feasible flow f (i) for this type, we have
∑
e∈E
ce(fe,cwe)(fe,cwe
(i) − f (i)e ) ≤ 0. (5)
The reason is that in ICWE each type uses only the routes with the minimal costs. Therefore, for
any type i and any feasible flow f (i) for type i, we have
∑
r∈Ri
cr(f
(1:K)
cwe )f
(i)
r,cwe ≤
∑
r∈Ri
cr(f
(1:K)
cwe )f
(i)
r .
This leads to
0 ≥
∑
r∈Ri
cr(f
(1:K)
cwe )(f
(i)
r,cwe − f
(i)
r ) =
∑
r∈Ri
(∑
e:e∈r
ce(fe,cwe)
)
(f (i)r,cwe − f
(i)
r )
=
∑
e∈E
ce(fe,cwe)
∑
r∈Ri: e∈r
(f (i)r,cwe − f
(i)
r ) =
∑
e∈E
ce(fe,cwe)(f
(i)
e,cwe − f
(i)
e ),
which is the desired inequality, showing Equation Eq. (5). We next proceed with the proof.
Part (a): this holds because a traffic network with one type is a special case of traffic network
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with multiple information types and part (a) of Proposition 5 shows the infimum is zero.
Part (b): using Equation Eq. (5) for f (i) = f
(i)
so for any i ∈ [K], and taking summation over all
types i ∈ [K], we obtain
Ccwe =
∑
e∈E
fe,cwece(fe,cwe) =
K∑
i=1
∑
e∈E
ce(fe,cwe)f
(i)
e,cwe ≤
K∑
i=1
∑
e∈E
ce(fe,cwe)f
(i)
e,so
=
∑
e∈E
ce(fe,cwe)
K∑
i=1
f (i)e,so =
∑
e∈E
fe,soce(fe,cwe)
=
∑
e∈E
fe,soce(fe,so) +
∑
e∈E
fe,so (ce(fe,cwe)− ce(fe,so))
≤
∑
e∈E
fe,soce(fe,so) +
1
4
∑
e∈E
fe,cwece(fe,cwe),
where the last inequality comes from the fact that with ce(x) = aex+ be for be, ae ≥ 0, we have
fe,so (ce(fe,cwe)− ce(fe,so)) = aefe,so(fe,cwe − fe,so) ≤
1
4
f2e,cweae ≤
1
4
fe,cwece(fe,cwe).
The proof of tightness follows from part (b) of Proposition 5 as a traffic network with one type is
a special case of a traffic network with multiple information types.
Part (c): using the same argument as in part (b), we obtain
Ccwe =
∑
e∈E
fe,cwece(fe,cwe) ≤
∑
e∈E
fe,soce(fe,so) +
∑
e∈E
fe,so (ce(fe,cwe)− ce(fe,so))
≤
∑
e∈E
fe,soce(fe,so) + β(C)
∑
e∈E
fe,cwece(fe,cwe),
where the last inequality comes from the fact that
fe,so (ce(fe,cwe)− ce(fe,so)) ≤ β(ce, fe,cwe)fe,cwece(fe,cwe) ≤ β(C)fe,cwece(fe,cwe).
The proof of the tightness follows from part (c) of Proposition 5.
In concluding this section, we should note that in this environment with heterogeneous users,
there are alternatives to our formulation of the social optimum problem, which considers the “util-
itarian” social optimum, summing over the costs of all groups. An alternative would be to consider
a weighted sum or focus on the class of users suffering the greatest costs. We next illustrate that
if we focus on type-specific costs, even with affine cost functions, some groups of users may have
worse than 3/4 performance relative to the social optimum.
Example 4. Consider the network shown in Figure 7 with E1 = {e1}, E2 = {e1, e2}. The ICWE
is f
(1)
e1,cwe = s1 and f
(2)
e1,cwe =
1
a
− s1, f
(2)
e2,cwe = s2 −
1
a
+ s1. The equilibrium costs are C
(1)
cwe = s1
and C
(2)
cwe = s2. The social optimum is f
(1)
e1,so = s1 and f
(2)
e1,so =
1
2a − s1, f
(2)
e2,so = s2 −
1
2a + s1. The
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ce1
(x) = ax
ce2
(x) = 1
Figure 7: Example 4, type-specific efficiency loss versus aggregate efficiency loss.
corresponding costs are C
(1)
so =
s1
2 and C
(2)
so =
−1
4a + s2 +
s1
2 (assuming
1
2a ≥ s1 and s2 ≥
1
a
− s1).
Therefore, we have
C
(1)
so
C
(1)
cwe
=
1
2
,
C
(2)
so
C
(2)
cwe
=
−1
4a + s2 +
s1
2
s2
, and
C
(1)
so + C
(2)
so
C
(1)
cwe + C
(2)
cwe
=
s1 + s2 −
1
4a
s1 + s2
.
We next show that the ratio of the aggregate costs is greater than or equal to 3/4. We have
s1 + s2 ≥
1
a
which leads to
Cso
Ccwe
=
s1 + s2 −
1
4a
s1 + s2
= 1−
1
4a
1
s1 + s2
≥ 1−
1
4a
a =
3
4
.
However, the type-specific efficiency loss can be smaller than 34 as we have
C
(1)
so
C
(1)
cwe
< 34 .
8 Concluding Remarks
GPS-based route guidance systems, such as Waze or Google maps, are rapidly spreading among
drivers because of their promise of reduced delays as they inform their users about routes that they
were not aware of or help them choose dynamically between routes depending on recent levels of
congestion. Nevertheless, there is no systematic analysis of the implications for traffic equilibria
of additional information provided to subsets of users. In this paper, we systematically studied
this question. We first extended the class of standard congestion games used for analysis of traffic
equilibria to a setting where users are heterogeneous because of their different information sets about
available routes. In particular, each user’s information set contains information about a subset of
the edges in the entire road network, and drivers can only utilize routes consisting of edges that are
in their information sets. We defined the notion of Information Constrained Wardrop Equilibrium
(ICWE), an extension of the classic Wardrop Equilibrium notion, and established the existence and
essential uniqueness of ICWE.
We then turned to our main focus, which we formulate in the form of Informational Braess’
Paradox (IBP). IBP asks that whether users receiving additional information can become worse
off. Our main result is a comprehensive answer to this question. We showed that in any network
in the Series of Linearly Independent (SLI) class, which is a strict subset of series-parallel network,
IBP cannot occur, and in any network that is not in the SLI class, there exists a configuration of
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edge-specific cost functions for which IBP will occur. The SLI class is comprised of networks that
join linearly independent networks in series, and linearly independent networks are those for which
every path between origin and destination contains at least one edge that is not in any other such
path. This is the property that enables us to prove that IBP cannot occur in any SLI network.
We also showed that any network that is not in the SLI class necessarily embeds at least one of a
specific set of basic networks, and then used this property to show that IBP will occur for some
cost configurations in any non-SLI network. We further proved that whether a given network is
SLI can be determined in linear time. Finally, we also established that the worst-case inefficiency
performance of ICWE is no worse than the standard Wardrop Equilibrium with one type of users.
There are several natural research directions which are opened up by our study. These include:
• Our analysis focused on the effect of additional information on the set of users receiving the
information. For what classes of networks is additional information very harmful for other
users? This question is important from the viewpoint of fairness and other social objectives.
We may like that users utilizing route guidance systems are experiencing lower delays, but
not if this comes at the cost of significantly longer delays for others.
• How “likely” are the cost function configurations that will cause IBP to occur in non-SLI
networks. This question is important for determining, ex-ante before knowing the exact
traffic flows, whether additional information for some sets of users, coming for example from
route guidance systems, might be harmful.
• Is there an “optimal information” configuration for users of a traffic network? Specifically,
one could consider the following question: given the traffic demands of K types, s1, . . . , sK ,
find the information sets E1, . . . , EK that generate the minimum overall cost for all types in
an ICWE. This question is related to Roughgarden [2001, 2006] who investigate the question
of finding the subnetwork of the initial network that leads to optimal equilibrium cost with
one type of user.
• We established a sufficient condition under which IBP does not occur on a traffic network
with multiple origin-destination pairs. One natural question is to find sufficient and necessary
condition for this problem.
• Finally, our study poses an obvious empirical question, complementary to similar studies for
the Braess’ Paradox: are there real-world settings where we can detect IBP?
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proofs of Section 3
9.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Since for any e ∈ E the function ce(·) is nondecreasing,
∫ fe
0 ce(z)dz as a function of f
(i)
r is convex
and continuously differentiable.
Claim 1: If f (1:K) is an optimal solution of Eq. (2), then it is an ICWE.
Since the objective function is convex and the constraints are affine functions, regularity conditions
holds and KKT conditions are satisfied, i.e., there exists µi,r ≤ 0 and λi such that for all i ∈ [K]
and r ∈ Ri we have
∂
∂f
(i)
r

∑
e∈E
∫ fe
0
ce(z)dz −
K∑
i=1
λi

∑
r∈Ri
f (i)r − si

+∑
r,i
µr,if
(i)
r

 = 0, (6)
where µr,i = 0 for f
(i)
r > 0 Bertsekas [1999, Chapter 3]. We show that the flow f (1:K) is an
ICWE with the equilibrium cost of type i being λi. First, note that f
(1:K) is a feasible flow by the
constraints of Eq. (2). Second, we can rewrite Eq. (6) as
∑
e∈E
∂fe
∂f
(i)
r
ce(fe) =
∑
e∈E : e∈r
ce(fe) =

= λi if f
(i)
r > 0,
≥ λi if f
(i)
r = 0,
(7)
where we used µr,i = 0 for f
(i)
r > 0 in the first case and µr,i ≤ 0 for f
(i)
r = 0 in the second case.
This is exactly the definition of ICWE which completes the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 2: If f (1:K) is an ICWE, then it is an optimal solution of Eq. (2).
We let the equilibrium cost of type i users be λi which leads to the following relation
∑
e∈E : e∈r
ce(fe) =

= λi if f
(i)
r > 0,
≥ λi if f
(i)
r = 0.
(8)
For all i ∈ [K] and r ∈ Ri, if f
(i)
r > 0, then we define µi,r = 0 and if f
(i)
r = 0, then we define
µi,r = λi −
∑
e∈E : e∈r ce(fe). First, note that µi,r ≤ 0 and if f
(i)
r > 0, then µi,r = 0. Second, note
that
∂
∂f
(i)
r

∑
e∈E
∫ fe
0
ce(z)dz −
K∑
i=1
λi

∑
r∈Ri
f (i)r − si

+∑
r,i
µr,if
(i)
r

 = 0. (9)
Therefore, the flow f (1:K) together with λi and µi,r satisfy the KKT conditions. Since the objective
function of Eq. (2) is convex and the constraints are affine functions, KKT conditions are sufficient
for optimality Bertsekas [1999, Chapter 3], proving the claim.
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9.1.2 Proof of Theorem 1
The set of feasible flows f (1:K) is a compact subset of K|R|-dimensional Euclidean space. Since edge
cost functions are continuous, the potential function is also continuous. Weierstrass extreme value
theorem establishes that optimization problem Eq. (2) attains its minimum which by Proposition
1 is an ICWE.
We next, show that in two different equilibria f (1:K) and f˜ (1:K), the equilibrium cost for each type
is the same. By Proposition 1, both f (1:K) and f˜ (1:K) are optimal solutions of Eq. (2). Since Φ(·)
is a convex function, we have
Φ
(
αf (1:K) + (1− α)f˜ (1:K)
)
≤ αΦ
(
f (1:K)
)
+ (1− α)Φ
(
f˜ (1:K)
)
,
for any α ∈ [0, 1]. Since Φ
(
f (1:K)
)
and Φ
(
f˜ (1:K)
)
are both equal to optimal value of Eq. (2), and
for each e, the function
∫ fe
0 ce(z)dz is convex (its derivative with respect to fe is ce(fe) which is
non-decreasing), the functions
∫ fe
0 ce(z)dz for any e ∈ E must be linear between values of fe and
f˜e. This shows that all cost functions ce are constant between fe and f˜e and in particular the
equilibrium costs are the same.
9.2 Proofs of Section 4
9.2.1 Proof of Equivalence in Definition 5
We first show that each LI network G is the result of attaching several LI blocks in series. This
follows by induction on the number of edges. Using Definition 3, G is either the result of attaching
two LI networks in parallel or the result of attaching an LI network and a single edge in series. If G
is the result of attaching two LI networks in parallel, then G is biconnected and so is an LI block.
If G is the result of attaching an LI network G1 with a single edge, then the single edge is an LI
block and by induction hypothesis G1 is series of several LI blocks. Therefore, G is the result of
attaching several LI blocks in series.
We next show that the following two definitions are equivalent.
• An SLI network is either a single LI network or the connection of two SLI networks in series.
We let SET1 to denote the set of such networks.
• An SLI network consists of attaching several LI blocks in series. We let SET2 to denote the
set of such networks.
We show that SET1=SET2 by induction on the number of edges, i.e., we suppose that for any
network with number of edges less than or equal to m these two sets are equal and then show that
for networks with m+ 1 edges the two sets are equal as well (note that the base of this induction
for m = 1 corresponds to a single edge which evidently holds).
• If a network G belongs to SET1, then either it is a single LI network or is the result of
attaching two SLI networks in series. In the former case, it belongs to SET2 as we have
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Figure 8: Proof of Theorem 2: G1 is not LI and G2 has at least one route from O to D.
shown each LI network is the result of attaching several LI blocks. In the latter case, by
induction hypothesis both SLI subnetworks are the series of several LI blocks and so is their
attachment in series. This shows SET1 ⊆ SET2.
• If a network G belongs to SET2, then either it is a single LI block or is the result of attaching
several LI blocks in series. In the former case, by definition it belongs to SET1. In the latter
case, we let G1 to denote the LI block that contains origin and the series of the rest of LI
blocks by G2. G1 is SLI by definition as it is a single LI block and G2 is SLI by induction
hypothesis. Therefore, the series attachment of G1 and G2 belongs to SET1. This shows
SET2 ⊆ SET1, completing the proof.
9.2.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We first show that if a network G belongs to the class SLI, then none of the networks shown in
Figure 3 is embedded in it. First note that since all networks in the class SLI are series-parallel,
using part (b) of Proposition 2 implies that the Wheatstone network shown in Figure 3a is not
embedded in it. The SLI network G consists of several LI blocks that are attached in series. Using
part (a) of Proposition 2 none of the networks shown in Figure 3 (i.e., networks shown in Figs. 3b,
3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 3h, and 3i) can be embedded in one of the LI blocks. We next show that they
cannot be embedded in the series of two LI blocks as well. We let G1 and G2 be two LI blocks that
are attached in series where the resulting network from this attachment is H. Also, we let the node
c be the attaching node of these two networks. We will show that the network shown in Figure 3b
can not be embedded in H (a similar argument shows that the rest of the networks shown in Figure
3 cannot be embedded in it). In order to reach to a contradiction, we suppose the contrary, i.e., H
is obtained from the network shown in Figure 3b by applying the embedding procedure described
in Definition 4. We define the corresponding routes to e5, e1e4, and e2e3 in H by r3, r1 and r2.
Formally, we start from r3 = e5, r1 = e1e4, and r2 = e2e3 in the network shown in Figure 3b and at
each step of the embedding procedure whenever we divide an edge on ri (i = 1, 2, 3) we will update
ri by adding that edge and whenever we extend origin or destination we will add the new edge to
all ri’s. Given this construction, in the network H we have three routes r3, r1, and r2, where r1
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and r2 have a common node and they do not have any common node (except O and D) with r3.
This is a contradiction as all routes in H must have node c in common. This completes the proof
of the first part.
We next show that if none of networks shown in Figure 3 is embedded in G, then G belongs to the
class SLI. Proposition 2(b) implies that since Figure 3a is not embedded in G, it is series-parallel.
We next show that given a series-parallel network G, if G is not SLI then we can find an embedding
of one of networks shown in Figures 3b, · · · ,3i in it. The proof is by induction on the number of
edges of G. Following Definition 2, consider the last building step of the network G. If the last step,
is attaching two networks G1 and G2 in series, then assuming that G is not SLI, we conclude that
either G1 or G2 (or both) is not SLI. Therefore, by induction hypothesis, we can find an embedding
of one of the networks shown in Figures 3b,· · · , 3i in either G1 or G2, which in turn shown it is
embedded in G. If the last step, is attaching two networks G1 and G2 in parallel, then it must be
the case that that either G1 or G2 is not LI. Because otherwise the parallel attachment of two LI
networks is LI (Definition 3) and hence SLI, which contradicts the fact that G is not SLI. Without
loss of generality, we let the network that is not LI to be G1. Therefore, part (a) of Proposition 2
shows that there exist two routes r and r′ and a vertex v common to both routes such that both
sections rOv and r
′
Ov as well as rvD and r
′
vD are not equal (note that v 6∈ {O,D} because otherwise
if v = O, then rOv = r
′
Ov as both are the single node O).
Note that using part (b) of Proposition 2, there is a way to index vertices such that along
any route, the vertices have increasing indices. We let A be the last vertex (with the prescribed
indexing) before which the two routes r and r′ become the same (this vertex can be O itself). Since
v is the common vertex of theses two routes and rOv 6= r
′
Ov such a vertex exists. Because v is a
common vertex of r and r′ the two routes r and r′ have a common vertex between A and v. We
let A′ to be the first such vertex (it can be v itself). Similarly, we define B as the first vertex after
which r and r′ become the same (B can be D itself) and B′ as the last vertex after v for which r
and r′ coincide (B′ can be v itself). Given these definitions for the nodes v,A,A′, B, and B′, we
know that rAA′ (the path between A and A
′ on r) and r′AA′ (the path between A and A
′ on r′) do
not have any vertex in common and similarly rBB′ and r
′
BB′ do not have any vertex in common.
The definition of the nodes A,A′, B,B′ is illustrated in Figure 8. Next, we show that one of the
networks shown in Figures 3b,. . . , 3i is embedded in G. We have the following cases:
• A = O, B = D, A′ = v, and B′ = v: in this case, the network shown in Figure 3b is embedded
in G. This is because there are two disjoint paths from O to v and from v to D and there is
at least one path from O to D in G2. Since any other edge and vertex of the network belongs
to a path that connects O to D, we can construct the graph G by starting from the network
shown in Figure 3b and applying the embedding procedure.
• A = O, B = D, and A′ 6= v or B′ 6= v: in this case, the network shown in Figure 3c is
embedded in G. This is because there is at least one path from O to D in G2 and the
network shown in Figure 3c is embedded in G1. To see this, note that the edges e1 and e2
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Figure 9: Two operations that turns a series-parallel network into a single edge.
are embedded in the section of the routes r and r′ between O and A′, and the edges e3 and
e4 are embedded in the the section of the routes r and r
′ between B′ and D. Also, note that
the single edge e6 is embedded in the network between A
′ and B′ (single edge is embedded
in any network).
• A 6= O, B = D, and A′ = v and B′ = v: the network shown in Figure 3d is embedded in G.
• A = O, B 6= D, and A′ = v and B′ = v: the network shown in Figure 3e is embedded in G.
• A = O, B 6= D, and A′ 6= v or B′ 6= v: the network shown in Figure 3f is embedded in G.
• A 6= O, B = D, and A′ 6= v or B′ 6= v: the network shown in Figure 3g is embedded in G.
• A 6= O, B 6= D, and A′ 6= v or B′ 6= v: the network shown in figure 3h is embedded in G.
• A 6= O, B 6= D, and A′ = v and B′ = v: the network shown in Figure 3i is embedded in G.
This completes the proof.
9.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We use the following results and definitions in this proof.
Proposition 7 (Valdes et al. [1979]). A network is series-parallel if following the steps S and P
shown in Figure 9 in any order, turns the network into a single edge connecting origin to destination.
Moreover, if a network is series-parallel, then in linear time O(|E| + |V |) we can obtain a binary
tree decomposition (shown in Figure 10) which indicates a sequence of S and P that turns G into
a single edge.
We now proceed with the proof of Proposition 3. Using Proposition 7, we first verify whether
G is series-parallel or not, which can be done in linear time. If G is not series-parallel, then it is
not SLI as well. If G is series-parallel, then a binary tree decomposition can be obtained in linear
time (again using Proposition 7). Note that the binary tree decomposition is not unique and the
following argument works with any binary tree decomposition. In this tree the edges of G are
represented by the leaves of the tree. We label the incident edges to origin by O and the incident
edges to destination by D (an edge might be labeled both O and D). Since G is SP, by definition
it is the result of attaching two SP networks in series or parallel. If it is the result of attaching two
SP networks in series, then there exist a node of the tree labeled S, referred to as the root of the
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Figure 10: Binary tree decomposition of a series-parallel network.
tree, such that on one of the subtrees starting from that node we only have O labeled leaves and
on the other subtree we only have D labeled leaves (this can be done in linear time by traversing
the tree). If G is the result of attaching two SP networks in parallel, then there exists a node of
the tree labeled P , again referred to as the root of the tree, such that on both subtrees starting
from it we have both O and D labeled leaves.
We next show by induction on the size of tree that whether the binary tree represents an SLI
network can be verified in linear time. If the root of the tree is S, then we have series of two
networks. By induction hypothesis in linear time we can verify whether each of these subtrees
represent and SLI network, which in turn determines whether G is SLI. If the root of the tree is P ,
we need to check whether each subtree represents an LI network. We next show this can be done
in linear time which concludes the proof.
Claim: Given the binary tree decomposition, we can verify whether the underlying network is LI
in linear time.
We show this claim by induction on the size of the tree as well. Starting from the root of the tree,
if the root has label P , then by induction hypothesis, for each of the subtrees denoted by T1 and
T2, we can verify whether the underlying network is LI in O(VT1) and O(VT2), respectively. The
underlying network is LI if and only if both of these subtrees represent an LI network. Therefore,
in O(V ) it can be verified whether the underlying network is LI. If the root is labeled S, then the
underlying network is LI if and only if one of the subtrees is only labeled S, and the other subtree
is LI. Using any traversing algorithm (breadth first search, or depth first search), one can visit all
nodes in both subtrees in linear time, verifying if it only has S labels. Furthermore, by induction
we can verify whether each subtree represents an LI network. Therefore, in linear time, we can
verify whether the network is LI, completing the proof.
9.3 Proofs of Section 5
9.3.1 Expansion of Example 2
We provide the example for part (a) of Example 2. Let K = 1, ce1(x) = x, ce2(x) = 1, ce3(x) =
1, ce4(x) = x, ce5(x) = 0 and s1 = 1. Also, we let the information sets be E1 = {e1, e2, e3, e4} and
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E˜1 = {e1, e2, e3, e4, e5}. In equilibrium, we have f
(1)
e1e3 = f
(1)
e2e4 =
1
2 with c
(1) = 32 and f˜
(1)
e1e3 = f˜
(1)
e2e4 =
0, f˜
(1)
e1e5e4 = 1 with c˜
(1) = 2. Therefore, after expanding the information set of type 1 users their
equilibrium cost has increased from 32 to 2.
9.3.2 Proof of the Claim of Remark 2
We will show that there are infinitely many cost functions for the network shown in Figure 3b for
which IBP occurs. In particular, we show the following claim.
Claim: For any a1, a3, a5 > 0 such that a1+a3 > a5, there exist non-negative b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, a2, s1,
and s2 such that with cost functions cei(x) = aix+bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, IBP occurs in the network shown in
Figure 3b. In particular, we show the following cost function parameters along with E2 = {e1, e4, e5},
E1 = {e2, e3, e5}, and E˜1 = {e1, e2, e3, e5} leads to IBP.
a4 = b1 = b3 = b5 = 0,
b2 = a1y = a1
a5(s1 + s2)
a1 + a3 + a5
,
b4 =
a5a3(s1 + s2)
a1 + a3 + a5
,
s1
s1 + s2
∈
(
a1 + a3
a1 + a3 + a5
,min
{
(a3 + a5)(a3a5 + a
2
1 + a1a3 + a1a5)− a1a
2
5
(a1 + a3 + a5) (a3a5 + a3a1 + a1a5)
, 1
})
,
a2 =
a25
(
s1
s1+s2
(a1 + a3 + a5)− a1
)
a5 (a1 + a3 + a5)
s1
s1+s2
− a1 (a1 + a3 + a5)
s2
s1+s2
− a3a5
− a3 − a5.
Proof: we let a4 = b1 = b3 = b5 = 0 and then find a2, b2, b4, s1, and s2 for which IBP occurs
with E2 = {e1, e4, e5}, E1 = {e2, e3, e5}, and E˜1 = {e1, e2, e3, e5}. We will find the a2, b2, b4, s1, and
s2 parameters such that before expanding the information set, the equilibrium flow is f
(2)
e5 = 0,
f
(2)
e1e4 = s2, and f
(1)
e5 = s1 − x, f
(1)
e2e3 = x. We will further impose the constraint that the cost of
route e5 for type 2 users is equal to the cost of route e1e4. For this to hold it is sufficient and
necessary to have a5(s1 − x) = a2x+ b2 + a3x, which leads to
x =
a5s1 − b2
a2 + a3 + a5
∈ [0, s1]. (10)
We also have a1s2 + b4 = a5(s1 − x), which leads to
a1s2 + b4 = a5
(
s1 −
a5s1 − b2
a2 + a3 + a5
)
(11)
We will also choose a2, b2, b4, s1, and s2 parameters such that after expanding the information set,
the equilibrium flow becomes f˜
(2)
e5 = s2, f˜
(2)
e1e4 = 0, f˜
(1)
e5 = s1 − y, f˜
(1)
e2e3 = 0, and f˜
(1)
e1e3 = y. We will
further impose the constraint that the cost of all available routes for each type of users are equal.
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For this to hold it is sufficient and necessary to have a5(s1 + s2 − y) = a1y + a3y, which leads to
y =
a5(s2 + s1)
a1 + a3 + a5
∈ (0, s1). (12)
We also have a1y + a3y = b2 + a3y, which after substituting y from Eq. (12) leads to
b2 = a1y = a1
a5(s2 + s1)
a1 + a3 + a5
. (13)
Also, for type 2 users we have a1y + b4 = a5(s2 + s1 − y), which after substituting y from Eq. (12)
leads to
b4 =
a5a3(s2 + s1)
a1 + a3 + a5
. (14)
Therefore, Equations Eq. (14) and Eq. (13) determine b2 and b4 as a function of other parameters.
In what follows we will show how to choose non-negative s1, s2, and a2 such that Equations Eq. (10),
Eq. (11), and Eq. (12) hold as well. After some rearrangements, we can see that the constraints
imposed by Equations Eq. (10) and Eq. (12) are equivalent to
s1
s2 + s1
≥
max{a5, a1}
a1 + a3 + a5
. (15)
Furthermore, IBP occurs if we have a1y + b4 > a1s2 + b4, which leads to
s2
s2+s1
< a5
a1+a3+a5
or
equivalently
s1
s2 + s1
>
a1 + a3
a1 + a3 + a5
. (16)
Using a1 + a3 > a5, Equations Eq. (15) and Eq. (16) become equivalent to
s1
s2 + s1
>
a1 + a3
a1 + a3 + a5
. (17)
Using Equation Eq. (11), we can find a2 as follows
a2 =
a25
((
s1
s2+s1
(a1 + a3 + a5)
)
− a1
)
a5
(
s1
s2+s1
(a1 + a3 + a5)
)
− a5a3 + a1
(
s1
s2+s1
(a1 + a3 + a5)
)
− a1(a1 + a3 + a5)
− a3 − a5,
(18)
with the condition that the right-hand side of Equation Eq. (18) is non-negative. From Eq. (17)
the non-negativity of a2 becomes equivalent to
s1
s1 + s2
(a1 + a3 + a5) ≤
(a3 + a5)(a3a5 + a
2
1 + a1a3 + a1a5)− a1a
2
5
(a3 + a5)(a5 + a1)− a25
. (19)
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Choosing s1
s1+s2
(a1 + a3 + a5) which satisfies both Equations Eq. (19) and Eq. (17) is feasible if we
have
a1 + a3 <
(a3 + a5)(a3a5 + a
2
1 + a1a3 + a1a5)− a1a
2
5
(a3 + a5)(a5 + a1)− a25
,
which after simplification becomes equivalent to a3a
2
5 > 0, and therefore holds. Hence, by choosing
s1
s1+s2
(a1 + a3 + a5) such that
s1
s1 + s2
(a1 + a3 + a5) ∈
(
a1 + a3,min
{
(a3 + a5)(a3a5 + a
2
1 + a1a3 + a1a5)− a1a
2
5
(a3 + a5)(a5 + a1)− a25
, a1 + a3 + a5
})
,
(20)
all the conditions are satisfied and IBP occurs in this network for infinitely many cost functions.
9.4 Proofs of Section 6
9.4.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Given the feasible flow f (1:K) for (G, E1:K , s1:K , c) we construct a feasible flow f with load
∑K
i=1 si
for a single type of users by letting fr =
∑K
i=1 f
(i)
r . Using this constructions, from two feasible flows
f (1:K) and f˜ (1:K) we obtain two feasible flows f and f˜ for a single type congestion game such that
the load of f is larger than or equal to the traffic demand of f˜ . Therefore, part (a) follows from
Milchtaich [2006, Lemma 5].
We next show part (b). Since part (a) holds for any two feasible flows, we can apply it for the
equilibrium flows f (1:K) and f˜ (1:K) over the traffic networks (G, E1:K , s1:K , c) and (G, E˜1:K , s1:K , c),
respectively (we can view f (1:K) as a feasible flow over the traffic network (G, E˜1:K , s1:K , c) as well).
It follows that there exists a route r such that
∑K
i=1 f
(i)
r >
∑K
i=1 f˜
(i)
r and fe ≥ f˜e for all e ∈ r.
From the first inequality it follows that
∑K
i=1 f
(i)
r > 0 which shows at least one of the types, say
type i, sends a positive traffic on route r. Note that i can be any element of [K] (it can also be 1
as the flow f (1:K) is a feasible flow for the traffic network (G, E1:K , s1:K , c)). We obtain
c(i) = cr ≥ c˜r ≥ c˜
(i),
where the first equality follows from f
(i)
r > 0. The first inequality follows from fe ≥ f˜e for all e ∈ r.
The second inequality follows from the definition of ICWE and the fact that if type i users can use
route r in (G, E1:K , s1:K , c), then they can use it in (G, E˜1:K , s1:K , c) as well since the information
sets are not smaller in the second game. This completes the proof.
9.4.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Part (a): Suppose f (1:K) is an equilibrium flow on G. We next show that the restriction of f (1:K)
to G1 creates an equilibrium for G1. Consider type i users and let r1 be a route in G1 such that
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f
(i)
r1 > 0 and let r
′
1 be another route in G1 which belongs to the information set of type i users.
The route r1 is part of a route r in G for which f
(i)
r > 0. We let r2 be the restriction of r to G2 (so
that r = r1 + r2). Since f
(1:K) is an equilibrium of G, we have cr = cr1 + cr2 ≤ cr′1 + cr2 = cr′1+r2
which leads to cr1 ≤ cr′1 , showing that the restriction of f
(1:K) to G1 is an equilibrium. Similarly,
the restriction to G2 is an equilibrium.
Part (b): We consider an equilibrium f (1:K) for G and then using part (a) we consider the equilibria
of G1 and G2 obtained by restriction of f
(1:K) to G1 and G2. For a type i and route r such that
f
(i)
r > 0, we have c(i) = cr = cr1 + cr2 , where r1 and r2 are the restriction of r to G1 and G2,
respectively (note that the only common node of r1 and r2 is the destination of G1 which is the
same as the origin of G2, hence the operation r1 + r2 is a valid operation). Since f
(i)
r1 > 0 and
f
(i)
r2 > 0 we have cr1 = c
(i)
1 and cr2 = c
(i)
2 , which leads to c
(i) = c
(i)
1 + c
(i)
2 .
9.4.3 Proof of Theorem 4
We first show two lemmas that we will use in the proof. The first lemma directly follows from the
results of Milchtaich [2006] for single type congestion game.
Lemma 4. Consider a traffic network with multiple information types (G, E1:K , s1:K , c). Let f
(1:K)
and f˜ (1:K) be two (arbitrary) non-identical feasible flows such that
∑K
i=1 si ≥
∑K
i=1 s˜i. If G is
series-parallel, there exists a route r such that fe ≥ f˜e and fe > 0 for all e ∈ r.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, given a feasible flow f (1:K) for (G, E1:K , s1:K , c) we define
a feasible flow f with traffic demand
∑K
i=1 si for a congestion game with a single information type.
Therefore, this lemma follows from Milchtaich [2006, Lemma 2].
Lemma 5. Consider a traffic network with multiple information types (G, E1:K , s1:K , c) where Ei =
E for i = 2, . . . ,K, E1 ⊆ E, and G is a SP network. Consider an ICWE with flow (f
(1), . . . , f (K))
and let r be a route for which fe > 0 for any e ∈ r. We have
cr ∈
[
min
i∈[K]
c(i),max
i∈[K]
c(i)
]
,
where for any i ∈ [K], c(i) denotes the equilibrium cost of type i users.
Proof. Since all the types except type 1 have full information, we have c(i) = c(j), for all i, j ∈
{2, . . . ,K}, maxi∈[K] c
(i) = c(1), and mini∈[K] c
(i) = c(j), j 6= 1. By definition of ICWE, we have
cr ≥ c
(i) (as r ∈ Ri) for all i ≥ 2. This leads to cr ≥ mini∈[K] c
(i), showing the lower bound. We
will next show the upper bound. We will prove this by induction on the number of edges of G. It
evidently holds for a single edge as all equilibrium costs are equal to cr. We next show the result
for a series-parallel network G. Since G is SP, it is either the result of attaching two SP networks
in series or attaching two SP networks in parallel. If G is the result of attaching two SP networks
GA and GB in series, then using part (a) of Lemma 2, an ICWE for the overall network is obtained
by concatenating an ICWE for GA with an ICWE for GB . We let rA and rB denote the sections
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of r that belong to GA and GB , respectively. We also let c
(i)
A and c
(i)
B be the equilibrium costs of
type i users in GA and GB , respectively. By induction hypothesis, we have crA ≤ maxi∈[K] c
(i)
A and
crB ≤ maxi∈[K] c
(i)
B . Since the traffic demands of type 1 users on both GA and GB are non-zero, we
have maxi∈[K] c
(i)
A = c
(1)
A and maxi∈[K] c
(i)
B = c
(1)
B . This leads to
cr = crA + crB ≤ c
(1)
A + c
(1)
B = c
(1),
where we used part (b) of Lemma 2 in the last equality.
Now suppose that G is the result of attaching GA and GB in parallel and suppose r ∈ GA.
Let T = {i ≥ 2 : f
(i)
A > 0} denotes the set of types that are sending a non-zero flow over GA.
Depending on whether T = ∅, we have the following two cases:
• T = ∅: since fe > 0 for all e ∈ r, at least one type must send a non-zero flow over GA and
since T = ∅, only type 1 sends a non-zero flow over GA. Therefore, we have cr = c
(1). We
also have c(1) ≤ maxi∈[K] c
(i), leading to cr ≤ maxi∈[K] c
(i).
• T 6= ∅: we either have f
(1)
A > 0 or f
(1)
A = 0. If f
(1)
A > 0, then by induction hypothesis, we have
cr ≤ max
i∈T∪{1}
c
(i)
A = max
i∈T∪{1}
c(i) ≤ max
i∈[K]
c(i),
where the equality holds because each type i ∈ T ∪ {1} sends a positive flow over A and its
equilibrium cost in G is the same as its equilibrium cost in GA. If f
(1)
A = 0, then again by
induction hypothesis and using T 6= ∅, we have
cr ≤ max
i∈T
c
(i)
A = max
i∈T
c(i) ≤ max
i∈[K]
c(i),
where the equality holds because each type i ∈ T sends a positive flow over A.
This concludes the proof of lemma.
Proof of part (a) of Theorem 4: After expanding information set of type 1 users to E , we
obtain c˜(i) = c˜(1) for all i ∈ [K]. Using Lemma 4, there exists a route r such that fe ≥ f˜e and
fe > 0 for any e ∈ r. We have
cr ≥ c˜r ≥ c˜
(i) = c˜(1), ∀ i ∈ [K],
where the first inequality follows form fe ≥ f˜e, the second inequality follows from the definition
of ICWE, and the equality follows from E˜i = E for all i = 1, . . . ,K. Since E1 ⊆ E , we have
c(i) = c(j) ≤ c(1) for all i, j = 2, . . . ,K. Using Lemma 5, this leads to
cr ≤ max
i∈[K]
c(i) = c(1).
Combining the previous two relations leads to c˜(1) ≤ c(1).
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Proof of part (b) of Theorem 4: The proof is similar to the proof of part (b) of Theorem 3.
In Example 2 we have provided an example showing that IBP with restricted information sets can
occur over Wheatstone network shown in Figure 3a.
Suppose that a network G is not series-parallel. Using Proposition 2, G can be constructed from
Wheatstone network shown in Figure 3a by following the steps of embedding. To construct an
example for G, we start from the cost functions for which the embedded network features IBP with
restricted information sets and then following the steps of embedding we will update the information
sets as well as the cost functions in a way that IBP occurs in the final network which is G. The
updates are identical to those described in the proof of part (b) of Theorem 3 and establishes that
if IBP with restricted information sets is present in the initial network (i.e., the Whetstone network
shown in Figure 3a), it will be present in network G as well. This completes the proof of part (b).
9.4.4 Omitted Proof of Example 3
First, note that after expansion of information, without loss of generality, each type of users (i, j),
i = 1, 2 have at least two routes from Oi to Di. Because, otherwise, if a type with traffic demand s
has only one route r, we can consider an equivalent game in which we update the cost of all edges
on r from ce(x) to ce(x+s). Also, note that due to symmetry we can only consider the information
expansion of one of the types of the form (1, j). Therefore, without loss of generality we assume
that there exists one type from O2 to D2 with information about all edges of the network and there
exist either one or two types from O1 to D1. Below, we examine all possible cases and show that
IBP does not occur:
(1) There exist two types {(1, 1), (2, 1)} such that R2,1 = {e1e3, e2}, R1,1 = {e1}, and R˜1,1 =
{e1, e2e3}: If type (1, 1) does not use route e2e3 after information expansion, then equilibrium
remains the same. Now suppose, type (1, 1) uses route e2e3 (i.e., f˜
(1,1)
e1 < f
(1,1)
e1 = s1,1). If
f˜e1 ≤ fe1 , then we have
c˜(1,1) ≤ ce1(f˜e1) ≤ ce1(fe1) = c
(1,1),
which shows IBP does not occur. Now suppose f˜e1 > fe1 , which in turn shows f˜e2 < fe2 as
f˜e1 + f˜e2 = fe1 + fe2 = s1,1 + s2,1. We have
f˜e3 = f˜
(1,1)
e2e3
+ f˜ (2,1)e1e3 > f
(1,1)
e2e3
+ f (2,1)e1e3 = fe3 ,
where we used f˜
(1,1)
e2e3 > f
(1,1)
e2e3 = 0 and f˜
(2,1)
e1e3 ≥ f
(2,1)
e1e3 , which holds because f˜
(2,1)
e1e3 = f˜e1−f˜
(1,1)
e1 >
fe1 − s1,1 = fe1 − f
(1,1)
e1 = f
(2,1)
e1e3 . Therefore, we have
ce1(f˜e1) + ce3(f˜e3) ≤ ce2(f˜e2) ≤ ce2(fe2) ≤ ce1(fe1) + ce3(fe3), (21)
where the first inequality holds because f˜
(2,1)
e1e3 > f
(2,1)
e1e3 ≥ 0, the second inequality holds because
f˜e2 < fe2 , and the third inequality holds because f
(2,1)
e2 = s2,1−f
(2,1)
e1e3 > s2,1− f˜
(2,1)
e1e3 = f˜
(2,1)
e2 ≥
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0. Inequality Eq. (21) together with ce1(f˜e1) ≥ ce1(fe1) and ce3(f˜e3) ≥ ce3(fe3) shows that
the cost of all three edges before and after information expansion are the same, leading to
the same equilibrium cost for all types. Therefore, IBP does not occur in this case.
(2) There exist two types {(1, 1), (2, 1)} such that R2,1 = {e1e3, e2}, R1,1 = {e2e3}, and R˜1,1 =
{e1, e2e3}: If type (1, 1) does not use e1 after information expansion, then equilibrium remains
the same. Now suppose type (1, 1) uses route e1. We show IBP does not occur in this case
by considering all possibilities as follows:
– f˜e1 ≤ fe1 : Since fe1 + fe2 = s1,1 + s2,1 = f˜e1 + f˜e2 , we have f˜e2 ≥ fe2 . We also have
f˜e3 < fe3 , because
f˜e3 = f˜
(1,1)
e2e3
+ f˜ (2,1)e1e3 < f
(1,1)
e2e3
+ f (2,1)e1e3 = fe3 ,
where we used f˜
(1,1)
e2e3 < f
(1,1)
e2e3 as type (1, 1) is using e1 after information expansion and
f˜
(2,1)
e1e3 < f
(2,1)
e1e3 as f˜
(2,1)
e1e3 = f˜e1 − f˜
(1,1)
e1 < fe1 = f
(2,1)
e1e3 . The inequality f˜
(2,1)
e1e3 < f
(2,1)
e1e3 implies
f˜
(2,1)
e2 > f
(2,1)
e2 ≥ 0. Therefore, we have
ce2(f˜e2) ≤ ce1(f˜e1) + ce3(f˜e3) ≤ ce1(fe1) + ce3(fe3) ≤ ce2(fe2), (22)
where the first inequality follows from f˜
(2,1)
e2 > 0, the second inequality follows from
f˜e1 ≤ fe1 and f˜e3 ≤ fe3 , and the third inequality follows from f
(2,1)
e1e3 > f˜
(2,1)
e1e3 ≥ 0.
Inequality Eq. (22) leads to
c(1,1) = ce2(f˜e2) + ce3(f˜e3) ≤ ce2(fe2) + ce3(fe3) ≤ c˜
(1,1),
showing IBP does not occur.
– f˜e1 > fe1 : Since fe1 + fe2 = s1,1 + s2,1 = f˜e1 + f˜e2 , we have f˜e2 < fe2 . If f˜e3 ≤ fe3 , then
we have
c(1,1) = ce2(f˜e2) + ce3(f˜e3) ≤ ce2(fe2) + ce3(fe3) ≤ c˜
(1,1),
showing IBP does not occur. Otherwise, we have f˜e3 > fe3 . First note that if f˜e3 > fe3 ,
then f˜
(2,1)
e1e3 > f
(2,1)
e1e3 . This inequality holds because
f˜ (2,1)e1e3 = f˜e3 − f˜
(1,1)
e2e3
> fe3 − f
(1,1)
e2e3
= f (2,1)e1e3 ,
where we used f˜e3 > fe3 and f˜
(1,1)
e2e3 < f
(1,1)
e2e3 as (1, 1) uses e1 after the expansion of
information (i.e., f
(1,1)
e2e3 = s1,1 and f˜
(1,1)
e2e3 < s1,1). Therefore, we have
ce1(f˜e1) + ce3(f˜e3) ≤ ce2(f˜e2) ≤ ce2(fe2) ≤ ce1(fe1) + ce3(fe3), (23)
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where the first inequality holds because f˜
(2,1)
e1e3 > f
(2,1)
e1e3 ≥ 0, the second inequality holds
because f˜e2 < fe2 , and the third inequality holds because f
(2,1)
e2 = s2,1 − f
(2,1)
e1e3 > s2,1 −
f˜
(2,1)
e1e3 = f˜
(2,1)
e2 ≥ 0. Inequality Eq. (23) together with f˜e1 > fe1 and f˜e3 > fe3 leads to
ce1(fe1) = ce1(f˜e1), ce2(fe2) = ce2(f˜e2), and ce3(fe3) = ce3(f˜e3). Therefore, we have
c˜(1,1) ≤ ce2(f˜e2) + ce3(f˜e3) = ce2(fe2) + ce3(fe3) = c
(1,1),
showing IBP does not occur.
(3) There exist three types {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1)} such that R2,1 = {e1e3, e2}, R1,2 = {e1, e2e3},
R1,1 = {e1}, and R˜1,1 = {e1, e2e3}: This case is similar to the first case. If type (1, 1) does
not use e2e3 after the expansion of information, then equilibrium remains the same. Now
suppose, type (1, 1) uses route e2e3 (i.e., f˜
(1,1)
e1 < f
(1,1)
e1 = s1,1). If f˜e1 ≤ fe1 , then we have
c˜(1,1) ≤ ce1(f˜e1) ≤ ce1(fe1) = c
(1,1),
which shows IBP does not occur. Now suppose f˜e1 > fe1 , which in turn shows f˜e2 < fe2 as
f˜e1 + f˜e2 = fe1 + fe2 = s1,1 + s1,2 + s2,1. We consider the following two cases:
– f˜
(1,1)
e1 + f˜
(1,2)
e1 < f
(1,1)
e1 + f
(1,2)
e1 (note that f
(1,1)
e1 = s1,1): we have
f˜ (2,1)e1e3 = f˜e1 −
(
f˜ (1,1)e1 + f˜
(1,2)
e1
)
> fe1 −
(
f (1,1)e1 + f
(1,2)
e1
)
= f (2,1)e1e3 ,
f˜ (1,1)e2e3 + f˜
(1,2)
e2e3
= s1,1 + s1,2 −
(
f˜ (1,1)e1 + f˜
(1,2)
e1
)
> s1,1 + s1,2 −
(
f (1,1)e1 + f
(1,2)
e1
)
= f (1,2)e2e3 .
These two inequalities lead to
f˜e3 = f˜
(2,1)
e1e3
+ f˜ (1,1)e2e3 + f˜
(1,2)
e2e3
> f (2,1)e1e3 + f
(1,2)
e2e3
= fe3 .
Therefore, we have
ce1(f˜e1) + ce3(f˜e3) ≤ ce2(f˜e2) ≤ ce2(fe2) ≤ ce1(fe1) + ce3(fe3), (24)
where the first inequality holds because f˜
(2,1)
e1e3 > f
(2,1)
e1e3 ≥ 0, the second inequality holds
because f˜e2 < fe2 , and the third inequality holds because f
(2,1)
e2 = s2,1 − f
(2,1)
e1e3 > s2,1 −
f˜
(2,1)
e1e3 = f˜
(2,1)
e2 ≥ 0. Inequality Eq. (24) together with f˜e1 > fe1 and f˜e3 > fe3 leads to
ce1(fe1) = ce1(f˜e1), ce2(fe2) = ce2(f˜e2), and ce3(fe3) = ce3(f˜e3). Therefore, the cost of all
three edges before and after information expansion are the same, leading to the same
equilibrium cost for all types. Therefore, IBP does not occur in this case.
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– f˜
(1,1)
e1 + f˜
(1,2)
e1 ≥ f
(1,1)
e1 + f
(1,2)
e1 : We have
f˜ (1,2)e1 =
(
f˜ (1,1)e1 + f˜
(1,2)
e1
)
− f˜ (1,1)e1 ≥
(
f (1,1)e1 + f
(1,2)
e1
)
− f˜ (1,1)e1 >
(
f (1,1)e1 + f
(1,2)
e1
)
− f (1,1)e1 = f
(1,2)
e1
,
(25)
f˜ (1,1)e2e3 + f˜
(1,2)
e2e3
= s1,1 + s1,2 −
(
f˜ (1,1)e1 + f˜
(1,2)
e1
)
≤ s1,1 + s1,2 −
(
f (1,1)e1 + f
(1,2)
e1
)
= f (1,2)e2e3 .
(26)
If f˜
(2,1)
e1e3 ≤ f
(2,1)
e1e3 , then Inequality Eq. (26) leads to
f˜e3 = f˜
(1,1)
e2e3
+ f˜ (1,2)e2e3 + f˜
(2,1)
e1e3
≤ f (1,2)e2e3 + f
(2,1)
e1e3
= fe3 .
Therefore, we obtain
ce1(f˜e1) = ce2(f˜e2) + ce3(f˜e3) ≤ ce2(fe2) + ce3(fe3) ≤ ce1(fe1), (27)
where the first equality holds because using Inequality Eq. (25) we obtain f˜
(1,2)
e1 >
f
(1,2)
e1 ≥ 0 and f˜
(1,1)
e2e3 > 0, the first inequality holds because f˜e2 < fe2 and f˜e3 < fe3 ,
and the second inequality holds because using Inequality Eq. (25) we obtain f
(1,2)
e2e3 =
s1,2 − f
(1,2)
e1 > s1,2 − f˜
(1,2)
e1 ≥ 0. Inequality Eq. (27) leads to
c˜(1,1) ≤ ce1(f˜e1) ≤ ce1(fe1) = c
(1,1),
showing IBP does not occur in this case.
Now suppose f˜
(2,1)
e1e3 > f
(2,1)
e1e3 which leads to
ce1(f˜e1) ≤ ce1(f˜e1) + ce3(f˜e3) ≤ ce2(f˜e2) ≤ ce2(fe2) ≤ ce2(fe2) + ce3(fe3) ≤ ce1(fe1),
(28)
where the second inequality holds because f˜
(2,1)
e1e3 > f
(2,1)
e1e3 ≥ 0, the third inequality holds
because f˜e2 < fe2 , and the last inequality holds because using Inequality Eq. (25) we
obtain f
(1,2)
e2e3 = s1,2 − f
(1,2)
e1 > s1,2 − f˜
(1,2)
e1 ≥ 0. Inequality Eq. (28) leads to
c˜(1,1) ≤ ce1(f˜e1) ≤ ce1(fe1) = c
(1,1),
showing IBP does not occur in this case.
(4) There exist three types {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1)} such that R2,1 = {e1e3, e2}, R1,2 = {e1, e2e3},
R1,1 = {e2e3}, and R˜1,1 = {e1, e2e3}: This case is similar to the second case.
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